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 Introduction 
Optimists would say the Brazilian competition policy has been a 
successful case of antitrust revolution in Latin America.3  In the 
1990s, the Administrative Council for Economic Defense (CADE or 
the Council) was granted autonomy within the Federal 
Administration thus becoming an independent agency with powers 
not only to adjudicate cases of antitrust violation but also review 
potentially anti-competitive mergers.4  Further developments in 
following decades included a leniency program to detect cartels, 
improvements in investigative tools against antitrust violators, and a 
 
 3.  Competition, or antitrust, policy can be broadly understood as the government action 
and respective legal regime aimed to promote competition in the markets, to the extent 
possible, by regulating practices that enhance market power. For competition law pur-
poses, market power is defined, in turn, as the ability to increase prices profitably by 
restricting the industry output. See PHILLIP AREEDA, HERBERT HOVENKAMP & JOHN L. 
SOLOW, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR 
APPLICATION, V. IIIB 109 (3 ed. 2007). But see MASSIMO MOTTA, COMPETITION 
POLICY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 30 (2004). (proposing a more specific concept to 
competition policy as “the set of policies and laws which ensure that competition in 
the marketplace is not restricted in such a way as to reduce economic welfare.”). I 
mention “antitrust revolution,” as an obvious reference to the book by Kwoka and 
White, to illustrate the introduction of economic theory as an analytical tool in the en-
forcement of competition law in Brazil. Cf. THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION: ECONOMICS, 
COMPETITION, AND POLICY, (John E. Kwoka & Lawrence J. White eds., 6 ed. 2013).; 
and A REVOLUÇÃO DO ANTITRUSTE NO BRASIL 2: A TEORIA ECONÔMICA APLICADA A 
CASOS CONCRETOS, (César Costa A. de Mattos ed., 2 ed. 2008). See Francisco Ribeiro 
Todorov & Marcelo Maciel Torres Filho, History of Competition Policy in Brazil: 
1930-2010, 57 ANTITRUST BULL. 207–257, 254 (2012). The success of the Brazilian 
competition policy is in fact internationally recognized. In this respect, it is worth 
mentioning that CADE has already received two Global Competition Review Awards 
(Antitrust Agency of the Year for the Americas in 2010 and 2014). See Conselho 
Administrativo De Defesa Econômico (CADE), CADE, CADE RECEBE TÍTULO DE 
AGÊNCIA ANTITRUSTE DAS AMÉRICAS EM 2014 (2015), 
http://www.cade.gov.br/Default.aspx?1629f90fe63cd052a491a2b181c9 (last visited 
Apr 23, 2015). 
 
 4.  See Decreto No. 8.884, de 11 de Junho de 1994, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] 
de 13.6.1994 (Braz.) [hereinafter 1994 Statute]. To be sure, the first Brazilian antitrust 
agency was created in the early 1960s as an administrative body of the Federal Gov-
ernment competent to adjudicate antitrust cases concerning collusion and abuses of 
market power. However, the first antitrust statute in Brazil did not formally establish a 
mandatory regime of merger control. See Decreto No. 4.137, de 10 de Setembro de 
1962, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U] de 12.11.1962 (Braz.).  See also PAULA A. 
FORGIONI, OS FUNDAMENTOS DO ANTITRUSTE 162 (5 ed. 2012). (affirming that the in-
dustrial policy under the military government had hindered the enforcement of the first 
antitrust statute in Brazil). 
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pre-merger notification regime finally introduced by a new competi-
competition statute in 2011.5 
This recent legislative reform, before anything else, has 
significantly strengthened CADE’s institutional capacities as it 
provided the expansion of technical staff and a new configuration for 
the antitrust enforcement system which concentrates both 
adjudicatory and investigatory powers in a single administrative 
agency.6  However, the perceived success of Brazilian competition 
policy vis-a-vis peer jurisdictions in Latin America hides 
inconsistencies in CADE’s administrative practice regarding an 
unusual topic: the interplay between merger control and labor market 
regulation. 
That policy interplay could well be seen as an old miscarriage of 
“antitrust justice” in developing countries without practical relevance 
in Brazil nowadays.7  It may not be the case, though.  Past 
intersections of different regulatory domains and the lack of 
accountability as to the reasons for eventually abandoning labor 
concerns can still affect the legitimacy of competition policy.8 Most 
importantly, such failures in policymaking also create potential 
conflicts between CADE and government bodies responsible for 
enforcing labor laws in Brazil.9 
 
 5.  See Decreto No. 10.149, de 21 de Dezembro de 2000, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO 
[D.O.U.] de 22.12.2000 (Braz.); Decreto 12.529, de 30 de Novembro de 2011, DIÁRIO 
OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 1.12.2011 (Braz.). [hereinafter 2011 Statute]. 
 6.  INTL ANTITRUST LAW AND POLICY: FORDHAM COMPETITION LAW 2014 533 (Barry E. 
Hawk ed., Juris Publishing 2015) (Under the 1994 Statute, antitrust investigations in 
Brazil were mainly carried out by the Secretariat of Economic Defense (SDE), a for-
mer department of the Ministry of Justice. The Brazilian antitrust enforcement system 
comprised then CADE, SDE and a department of the Ministry of Finance, the Secre-
tariat for Economic Monitoring (SEAE). With the enactment of the 2011 Statute, SDE 
was extinguished and SEAE’s competence has been almost completely restricted to 
competition advocacy). 
 7.  See William E. Kovacic, Merger Enforcement in Transition: Antitrust Controls on 
Acquisitions in Emerging Economies, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 1075, 1104 (1997). The in-
terplay between merger control and labor market regulation can still be seen in coun-
tries such as South Africa and Namibia. Cf. Patrick Smith & Andrew Swan, Public In-
terest Factors in African Competition Policy, 2014 THE AFRICAN AND MIDDLE 
EASTERN ANTITRUST REVIEW 1–6 (2014). 
 8.  In any case, foreign legal practitioners seem to be well aware of these antitrust issues 
in Brazilian competition law. Cf. ABA, MODEL ASSET PURCHASE AGREEMENT: WITH 
COMMENTARY 25 (2001). 
 9.  See Kovacic, supra note 7, at 1104. 
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In view of those possible hurdles to antitrust implementation, 
this paper takes a normative stance on the question of how CADE 
could justify what appears to be a definitive shift in competition 
policy away from labor market regulation.  My analysis will be 
centered on the idea of policy justifications, i.e., instances of legal 
argumentation meant to support implementing decisions by agencies 
and other public authorities.  Accordingly, antitrust decision-making 
is framed within the argumentative discourse of competition law, 
understood as a product of practical reasoning informed by legal 
rules and economic knowledge.10 
That said, the present work is rather limited in scope.  I do not 
offer a positive answer as to whether and how CADE should justify 
its decision to break the interplay between merger control and labor 
market regulation.  Instead, my claim is only that, in defense of such 
implementation choice, justifications grounded on economic theory 
may become an informal fallacy.11  This paper thus contributes to the 
literature by identifying logical flaws in at least one legal argument 
that could justify a policy decision so far implicit in Brazilian 
competition law.  This hypothetical argument, which I propose to 
both construct and refute alongside this paper, is called the 
Inefficiency Thesis. 
Additionally, this paper offers contributions at a more theoretical 
level.  Because it is such an unusual topic in antitrust policy, the 
broken interplay between merger control and labor market regulation 
in Brazil permits the exploration of the impact of economic 
 
 10.  Cf. Kaarlo Tuori, Two Challenges to Normative Legal Scholarship, 53 SCANDINAVIAN 
STUDIES IN LAW 177–202, 182 (2008). (“Legal discourse consists of speech acts which 
take a position on legal norms and their interpretation and application, and which, 
thus, contribute to the ongoing discussion on the contents of the legal order in force.”). 
See Thomas F. Cotter, Legal Pragmatism and the Law and Economics Movement, 84 
GEO. LJ 2071, 2137 (1995). (“[E]conomics can assist the policymaker by supplying 
her with accurate predictions [. . .] the need to predict consequences is fundamental to 
most of the various formulations of practical reason.”). 
 11.  My reference to fallacies as “informal” indicates that the concept is more comprehen-
sive than the standard definition of an invalid argument that merely appeals to be val-
id. From this broad perspective, which emerges in the literature of informal logics and 
dialectical argumentation, “a fallacy is regarded as a deficient move in an argumenta-
tive discourse or text.” FRANS H. VAN EEMEREN & ROB GROOTENDORST, A 
SYSTEMATIC THEORY OF ARGUMENTATION THE PRAGMA-DIALECTICAL APPROACH 158 
(2003). About the criteria to identify a fallacious argumentative move, see infra Sec-
tion IV.A. 
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indeterminacy on legal discourse.12  While acknowledging the im-
portance of policy insights offered by economists, I demonstrate 
there are some scientific disagreements among them that can reduce 
the plausibility of legal arguments based on economic theory.  The 
forgotten case of labor concerns in Brazilian antitrust policy becomes 
relevant, then, as an illustration of how the epistemological limita-
tions of economics may lead to unsound argumentation in competi-
tion law.13 
Because my claim relates economic theory to legal argumenta-
tion and frames somewhat odd recommendations against uses of eco-
nomics in antitrust decision-making, a short methodological detour 
seems helpful from the outset.  For the sake of clarity, my assump-
tions about law, legal scholarship and legal reasoning must now be 
disclosed and explained.  First, as subject matter, law is understood 
here as an argumentative social practice in which legal scholars, 
 
 12.  A bout the implications of the economic indeterminacy to competition law, See, e.g., 
Alan J. Devlin & Michael S. Jacobs, Antitrust Divergence and the Limits of Econom-
ics, 104 NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 253–291, 256 (2010). (footnote 
omitted) (“[P]rice theory and econometric analysis cannot always generate such [une-
quivocal] conclusions, which leaves pressing questions of competition policy that eco-
nomic theory is incapable of answering in useful and coherent terms.”), and Eleanor 
M. Fox, Monopolization, Abuse of Dominance, and the Indeterminacy of Economics: 
The US/EU Divide, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 725–740, 728 (2006). (footnote omitted) 
(“‘Sound economics’ does not ineluctably produce a unitary rule. There are different 
and equally credible ways to design rules of antitrust with a view to serving consumers 
and producing competitive firms and robust markets.”), About the economic indeter-
minacy regarding the antitrust and innovation, see, e.g., Douglas H. Ginsburg & Josh-
ua D. Wright, Dynamic Analysis and the Limits of Antitrust Institutions, 78 ANTITRUST 
LAW JOURNAL 1–21, 5 (2012). (footnote omitted) (“The simple fact is that economics 
does not yet provide a useful understanding of the relationships among market struc-
ture, competition, and  innovation.”) and Joshua D. Wright, Antitrust, Multi-
Dimensional Competition, and Innovation: Do We Have an Antitrust-Relevant Theory 
of Competition Now?,  in COMPETITION POLICY AND PATENT LAW UNDER 
UNCERTAINTY , 239 (Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright eds., 2010). (footnote 
omitted) (“Many scholars have recognized that our empirical knowledge of the rela-
tionship between market structure and innovation, as well between market structure 
and consumer welfare, is limited relative to our understanding of static price effects in 
conventional product markets.”). 
 13.  See Devlin and Jacobs, supra note 12 at 256. See also, Cf. Péter Cserne, Conse-
quence-based Arguments in Legal Reasoning: A Jurisprudential Preface to Law and 
Economics,  in EFFICIENCY, SUSTAINABILITY, AND JUSTICE TO FUTURE GENERATIONS 
31–54, 33 (Klaus Mathis ed., 2012). (“If economic arguments can be recast as pruden-
tial [consequence-based] arguments then the relevance of economic analysis for legal 
reasoning will depend on the acceptability of those kinds of arguments.”). 
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along with courts, agencies, and lawyers, participate and contribute to 
its development.14 
Second, legal scholarship is considered a kind of practical dis-
course that provides guidance to deliberations about the course of ac-
tion to be taken to achieve a desired goal.15  In producing legal schol-
arship, academics formulate normative prescriptions that, explicitly 
or implicitly, seek to influence the practical reasoning of decision-
makers, recommending how to create, interpret, and enforce legal 
rules.  In the final analysis, normative prescriptions are meant to in-
fluence how legal decision-makers argue about the law.16  As for the 
method of legal scholarship, I assume that such academic research is 
conducted via a dialectical argumentation of some sort.17  It means 
legal scholars produce a practical knowledge through argumentative 
discussions between rational arguers who put forward justifications, 
or refutations, in support, or rejection, to a given standpoint.18 
The point of view disputed in such dialogical procedures corre-
sponds to a proposition about law, what can be called legal thesis.19  I 
 
 14.  See generally, Stefano Bertea, Legal Argumentation Theory and the Concept of Law,  
in ANYONE WHO HAS A VIEW 213–226, 225 (Frans H. Van Eemeren et al. eds., 2003). 
(“[T]he thesis that argumentation is central in the legal domain entails the need to con-
struct the law as the outcome of deliberative reasoning, as an argumentative practice 
which differs remarkably from mere following the rules posited by the authority. This 
is to say that law is a dynamic interplay of reasons, a set of reconstructive activities by 
which theorists and practitioners jointly determine contents and applicative scope of 
norms.”). See also Steven J. Burton, Law as Practical Reason, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 
747–793, 748 (1988).  
 15.  Cf. John Finnis, Natural Law and Legal Reasoning, 38 CLEV. ST. L. REV 1–13, 1 
(1990). (“Legal reasoning is, broadly speaking, practical reasoning. Practical reason-
ing moves from reasons for action to choices (and actions) guided by those reasons.”). 
 16.  See Edward L. Rubin, Law and the Methodology of Law, WIS. L. REV. 521, 522 
(1997); Edward L. Rubin, The Evaluation of Prescriptive Scholarship, 10 TEL AVIV U. 
STUD. L. 101–114, 101 (1990). 
 17.  See RALPH H. JOHNSON, THE RISE OF INFORMAL LOGIC: ESSAYS ON ARGUMENTATION, 
CRITICAL THINKING, REASONING AND POLITICS 86 (1996). 
 18.  Cf. AULIS AARNIO, ESSAYS ON THE DOCTRINAL STUDY OF LAW 28 (2011). (“[T]he cen-
tral methodology of [legal scholarship] is not inductive or deductive but rational dis-
cursive. The method is legal argumentation, which produces a coherent network of 
reasons to support recommendations.”). See also Aleksander Peczenik, A Theory of 
Legal Doctrine, 14 RATIO JURIS 75–105 (2001).; JOSÉ REINALDO DE L. LOPES ET AL., O 
QUE É PESQUISA EM DIREITO? 84 (2005). 
 19.  While those propositions would traditionally refer to doctrinal issues regarding the 
interpretation and systematization of rules and principles, legal knowledge as consid-
ered here is not confined to these subjects. From a broader perspective, legal theses al-
so cover the decision-making process of institutional actors (e.g. legislators, courts, 
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also assume that lawyers in general, including legal decision-makers, 
engage in the same kind of dialectical argumentation when practicing 
law.20  In this way, legal reasoning can be understood as the dialecti-
cal “process of devising, reflecting on, or giving reasons for legal 
acts and decisions or justifications for speculative opinions about the 
meaning of law and its relevance to action.”21  Because lawyers are 
rational arguers engaged in continuous debates about legal theses, the 
argumentative moves performed by them must conform to certain 
pre-determined rules of dialogue.  These requirements of form and 
procedure, which regulate the exchange of arguments and counter-
arguments, can be understood as a code of conduct or, more general-
ly, a dialectical protocol.22 
As my final assumption, I consider that the code of conduct for 
argumentative discussions among lawyers allows resorting to theoret-
ical knowledge produced outside legal discourse, as a rational means 
to support their discussion moves.23  It means that findings from the 
social sciences are instrumentally relevant to the plausibility of nor-
mative prescriptions, produced by legal scholars, and justifications 
for legal decisions, offered by decision-makers.24  Likewise, I assume 
that Economic Analysis of Law (EAL), at least as a form of conse-
 
and agencies), the goals and values promoted by them, and the theory of public mo-
rality on which their decisions are grounded. Cf. Aleksander Peczenik & Jaap Hage, 
Legal Knowledge about What?, 13 RATIO JURIS 326–345, 334 (2000). (affirming that 
legal scholarship is also concerned with the evaluations of law in order to harmonize 
its normative background “in the form of morality and (political) philosophy.”). 
 20.  See GIOVANNI SARTOR, LEGAL REASONING: A COGNITIVE APPROACH TO THE LAW 80 
(2005). 
 21.  Neil MacCormick, LEGAL REASONING AND INTERPRETATION ROUTLEDGE 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward Craig ed., 1998). 
 22.  Cf. Giovanni Sartor, A Teleological Approach to Legal Dialogues,  in LAW, RIGHTS 
AND DISCOURSE: THE LEGAL PHILOSOPHY OF ROBERT ALEXY , 249 (George Pavlakos 
ed., 2007). (referring to the idea of a dialectical protocol for legal reasoning, such as 
the one offered by Alexy’s theory of legal argumentation). 
 23.  Tuori, supra note 10 at 181. (from the perspective of the Speech Act Theory, I borrow 
the concept of legal discourse defined as “a series or network of mutually linked legal 
speech acts.”).   
 24.  Cf. EVELINE T. FETERIS, FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL ARGUMENTATION: A SURVEY OF 
THEORIES ON THE JUSTIFICATION OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS 114 (2013). (explaining, ac-
cording to Alexy’s argumentation theory, that theoretical knowledge about facts might 
be required to construct arguments that provide an external justification to legal deci-
sions). See also Aulis Aarnio, Robert Alexy & Aleksander Peczenik, The Foundation 
of Legal Reasoning, 12 RECHTSTHEORIE 257–279, 277 (1981). 
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quentialist argumentation, is an acceptable way to justify or refute le-
gal theses and stands in accordance with the dialectical protocol.25 
Following the Introduction, the remainder of this paper is divid-
ed into five parts.  Part I introduces the interplay between merger 
control and labor market regulation in Brazil during the 1990s.  In 
this part, I explain the inconsistency in CADE’s decisions regarding 
the labor concerns of competition policy, pointing out the conse-
quences of this problem in terms of legitimacy and implementation.  
Part II frames possible solutions to that regulatory shortcoming as a 
matter of policy justification.  In this second part, I give a short ac-
count of Brazilian antitrust law so that I can identify which legal ar-
gument could justify the Council’s decision to abandon labor con-
cerns. 
Part III presents the normative framework employed to evaluate 
logical flaws in legal argumentation.  In this third part, I analyze the 
kind of argumentation produced by EAL and define it as a mix of 
consequentialist arguments and arguments from authority.  This nor-
mative framework allows me then to determine the conditions of 
plausibility for legal arguments based on economic theory.  In Part 
IV, I continue my logical analysis of the hypothetical argument for-
mulated in the previous sections.  In doing so, I demonstrate how dis-
agreements between economists may turn a policy justification in 
competition law into an informal fallacy.  Part V concludes the paper. 
I. Merger Control and Labor Market Regulation 
A. Regulatory Inconsistency in Brazilian Antitrust Law 
In the 1990s, CADE’s official statements expressed concerns 
with the possible impact of mergers on the employment level of the 
economy as cost-cutting transactions could allow the discharge of 
 
 25.  About EAL and consequentialist argumentation in Brazil, see generally Mariana 
Pargendler & Bruno Salama, Law and Economics in the Civil Law World: The Case of 
Brazilian Courts,  TULANE LAW REVIEW (2016).; and Mariana Pargendler & Bruno 
Salama, Direito e Consequência no Brasil: Em Busca de um Discurso sobre o Método, 
262 REVISTA DE DIREITO ADMINISTRATIVO 95–144 (2013). See also EJAN MACKAAY, 
LAW AND ECONOMICS FOR CIVIL LAW SYSTEMS 6 (2014). (explaining the basics of 
EAL as a method to determine the effects of legal rules and their respective economic 
incentives). 
 ILS Journal of International Law  Vol. V. No. II 
145 
workers made redundant after employing firms merge.26  CADE’s 
Annual Report for 1996, for instance, declared that competition poli-
cy in Brazil promotes social welfare by minimizing both private and 
social costs, suggesting that the merger review process should in-
clude a more comprehensive analysis of the outcomes of transactions 
under review.27 
According to the 1996 Annual Report, the relevant social costs 
to be considered in merger control include negative externalities of 
mergers between firms operating in certain labor markets, such as the 
frictional unemployment of low-skilled workers.28  Such externality 
would be considered a social cost because, despite being only a short-
run by-product of these transactions, it could eventually cause struc-
tural unemployment as well.29  In view of risks of unemployment in 
the long run, the Annual Report suggested that measures (i.e. legal 
remedies) applied by CADE via merger control could neutralize mac-
roeconomic inefficiencies resulted from transactions deemed efficient 
in a microeconomic sense.30 
To that end, CADE and the Brazilian Ministry of Labor entered 
into a cooperation agreement to jointly formulate and monitor job-
training programs, which would be implemented by merging firms as 
a condition for antitrust clearance of mergers.31  The legal basis for 
 
 26.  CADE, RELATÓRIO ANUAL 1996 37–38 (1997), 
http://www.cade.gov.br/Default.aspx?e142c24dd332f257e950.  
 27.  Id. at 37. 
 28.  In short, frictional unemployment results from job search costs, which make it diffi-
cult from workers to find job vacancies available in labor markets. Structural unem-
ployment, on the other hand, results from an actual mismatch between workers’ skills 
and the skill requirements for job vacancies. For a comprehensive review of different 
types of unemployment, see Stephen A. Woodbury, Unemployment, in LABOR AND 
EMPLOYMENT LAW AND ECONOMICS (Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Seth D. Harris, & Lo-
bel Orly eds., 2009). 
 29.  For a general view of remedies employed in competition law, see Massimo Motta, 
Michele Polo & Helder Vasconcelos, Merger Remedies in the European Union: An 
Overview, 52 ANTITRUST BULLETIN 603, 606 (2007). About merger remedies in Brazil, 
see José Marcelo M. Proença, Termos de Compromisso de Desempenho enquanto 
Solução Imposta pelo CADE,  in CONCENTRAÇÃO DE EMPRESAS NO DIREITO 
ANTITRUSTE BRASILEIRO , 270–271 (André M. Gilberto, Censo F. Campilongo, & 
Juliana G. Vilela eds., 2011). 
 30.  See CADE, supra note 26 at 39. 
 31.  See Id. at 37.  
  See also Extrato do Protocolo de Intenções celebrado entre União/Ministério do 
Trabalho e Emprego – MTE e o Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica – 
CADE, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de14.04.2000, and Extrato do Protocolo 
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mandated job training programs, as stated in the Annual Report, were 
provisions in Brazilian antitrust statutes determining that variations in 
employment level are taken into account when designing merger 
remedies to anticompetitive transactions.32  Allegedly, the enforce-
ment of competition law in Brazil could thus conform to constitu-
tional clauses that establish the promotion of full employment as a 
guiding principle for economic regulation.33 
My analysis of CADE decisions revealed that antitrust remedies 
were applied to minimize possible harm to workers’ welfare, which 
would supposedly result from a merger between employing firms.  
Two types of “employment measures” were identified, both of which 
designed to cope with eventual plant-closings and mass layoffs: (i) 
temporary maintenance of current employment level at firms’ plants 
and facilities; and (ii) implementation of job training programs for 
workers dismissed due to the internal reorganization of the merged 
firm.  These cases are indicated in the table below:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
de Intenção de Reestruturação Produtiva e Requalificação, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO 
[D.O.U.] de 31 mar. 1997.  
 32.  See 1994 Stature, art. 58, §1°: “Performance commitments [legal instruments for anti-
trust remedies] will take into consideration the extent of international competition in a 
certain industry and their effect on employment levels, among other relevant circum-
stances.” 
 33.  See Brazilian Constitution, art. 170, IV.   
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Year 
 
Merger 
Decision 
Parties 
 
Employment 
Policy 
Measures 
1995 AC 19/1994 
Oriento Indústria e 
Comércio S.A. and 
Ajinomoto Co. Inc. 
Employment 
level 
maintenance 
1996 AC 24/1995 
Grace Produtos Químicos e 
Plásticos Ltda. and Crown 
Química S.A. 
Job training 
program 
1996 AC 25/1995 
Santista Alimentos S.A. 
and CARFEPE S.A. 
Administradora e 
Participadora 
Job training 
program 
1996 AC 27/1995 
Kolynos do Brasil Ltda., 
Colgate-Palmolive 
Company and K&S 
Aquisições Ltda. 
Job training 
program 
1996 AC 14/1996 Siderúrgica Laisa S.A. and Cia. Siderúrgica Pains 
Job training 
program 
1997 AC 79/1996 
Panex S.A. Indústria e 
Comércio and Alcan 
Alumínio do Brasil S.A. 
Job training 
program 
2000 
AC 
08012.005846/
1999-12 
Fundação Antônio and 
Helena Zerrenner – 
Instituição Nacional de 
Beneficência et al. 
Employment 
level 
maintenance 
and job 
training  
program 
Source: elaborated by the author.34 
 
Nonetheless, as Brazilian competition policy develops after 
2000, these employment measures seem to be tacitly excluded from 
 
 34.  The sample of cases reported above was collected from the entire universe of merger 
decisions from 1994 to 2014, as published in CADE’s website (www.cade.gov.br). 
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CADE’s repertoire of merger remedies.35  This fact could mean that, 
for the last fifteen years, the Council has adopted a different reading 
of the antitrust statutes and the constitutional provisions that set the 
basis for economic regulation in Brazil.36  Such a departure from the 
early decisional patterns in merger cases, however, was not followed 
by any further notice or explicit account of CADE’s new administra-
tive practice. 
B. Legitimacy Problems and Policy Implementation 
With the discontinuation of employment measures, the enforce-
ment of Brazilian antitrust law becomes uncertain in respect to possi-
ble interactions with other regulatory fields.  This problem remains 
unresolved as a legal matter, as the policy reasons behind such a 
change in CADE’s administrative practice have not been disclosed.37  
Unsurprisingly, the absence of explicit grounds to support regulatory 
action raises concerns with transparency and accountability of policy-
making38 in the Brazilian regulatory state. Let us see now why the 
broken interplay between merger control and labor market regulation 
could impact the current competition policy in Brazil. 
 
 35.  To be sure, legal remedies determining the maintenance of employment levels in 
merging firms were applied after 2000 as a kind of preliminary measure, in order to 
assure the effectiveness of CADE’s final decisions. In these merger cases, however, 
the remedy purpose does not seem to be the promotion of full employment or the pro-
tection of competition in labor markets. 
 36.  Cf. Ciro Gomes, PARECER DA COMISSÃO ESPECIAL DE DEFESA DA CONCORRÊNCIA AO 
PROJETO DE LEI N. 3.937, DE 2004 40 (2007), 
http://www.camara.gov.br/proposicoesWeb/prop_mostrarintegra?codteor=569577&fil
ename=PRL+1+PL393704+%3D%3E+PL+3937/2004 (last visited Oct 17, 2015). 
(explaining that the legislative proposal for the new antitrust statute (Projeto de Lei 
No. 3937/2004) would constrain CADE’s discretion in order to avoid the imposition 
of clearance conditions unrelated to competition); See CALIXTO SALOMÃO FILHO, 
DIREITO CONCORRENCIAL 119 (2013).; and Christopher Townley & Cardinali, 
Adriana, A utilização dos precedentes da União Europeia no direito concorrencial 
brasileiro, in DIREITO ECONÔMICO E SOCIAL - ATUALIDADES E REFLEXÕES SOBRE 
DIREITO CONCORRENCIAL, DO CONSUMIDOR, DO TRABALHO E TRIBUTÁRIO 127, 160 
(João G. Rodas ed., 2012). 
 37.  Cf. Harry First & Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust’s Democracy Deficit, 81 FORDHAM 
LAW REVIEW 2543–2574, 2545 (2012). (pointing out the relevance of the due process 
for the administrative enforcement of antitrust laws). 
 38.  Cf. R. A. A. Khan & Gareth T. Davies, Merger Control and the Rule of Law, 2 
ERASMUS LAW REVIEW 25–57, 53 (2009). (discussing the lack of transparency and ac-
countability problems related to antitrust remedies). See Giandomenico Majone, The 
rise of the regulatory state in Europe, 17 WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS 77–101 (1994).   
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Political analyses addressing the function of independent admin-
istrative bodies – which also include antitrust agencies −, focus gen-
erally on issues of democratic legitimacy of non-majoritarian institu-
tions.39  Following this line of reasoning, the lack of justification for 
abandoning employment measures could mean that the Council has 
failed to meet the “reason-giving requirement” for policy-making.  
That is, the requirement meant to ensure the legitimacy of regulation 
in a procedural dimension, via judicial review and public participa-
tion.40  To the extent that such regulatory shift has yet to be justified, 
CADE’s decisions in merger cases remain somehow contradictory. 
Such an internal contradiction would reduce the legitimacy of Brazil-
ian antitrust policy also in a substantial dimension, related to the so-
cial expectations surrounding consistency in decision-making and 
regulator’s technical expertise.41 
However, while legitimation problems become relevant in a con-
text of diverging regulatory decisions, these concerns do not tackle 
specific consequences of inconsistent decision-making to the very 
process of policy implementation.  To explain my point, I build on a 
conceptual framework for implementation analysis that is already 
traditional in policy studies.42 Under this approach, the regulatory 
output of agencies can be understood to involve, along with adjudica-
tory decisions and regulations, some “general transitive goals,” which 
include both statutory objectives and declared intentions of agency 
officials about the policy pursued.43 
 
 39.  See Giandomenico Majone, Problems of the Regulatory State,  in REGULATING 
EUROPE , 292 (Giandomenico Majone ed., 1996). 
 40.  Giandomenico Majone, The regulatory state and its legitimacy problems, 22 WEST 
EUR. POLIT. 1–24, 14 (1999). 
 41.  Cf. Giandomenico Majone, From the Positive to the Regulatory State: Causes and 
Consequences of Changes in the Mode of Governance, 17 JOURNAL OF PUBLIC POLICY 
139–167, 191 (1997). (defining procedural and substantial legitimacy as categories for 
a general analysis of regulatory policy-making). 
 42.  See generally Paul Sabatier & Daniel Mazmanian, The Implementation of Public Pol-
icy: A Framework of Analysis, 8 POLICY STUDIES JOURNAL 538–560 (1980). 
 43.  See WILLIAM ESKRIDGE JR ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION AND 
REGULATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 973 (5 ed. 2014) (for a 
discussion of the implementation of regulator goals via informal administrative tools, 
such as policy statements and other public communications, as a usual practice in U.S. 
agencies); See also Paul A. Sabatier, Regulatory Policy-making: Toward a Framework 
of Analysis, 17 NAT. RESOURCES J. 415, 420 (1977). 
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The same analytical framework considers that a successful im-
plementation of regulatory policies depends on supportive public in-
stitutions–called the regulator’s “sovereigns” in the policy jargon–
that control legal and financial resources provided to implementing 
agencies.44 Considering only the provision of legal resources, we see 
that non-supportive attitudes by sovereign institutions 
(e.g. legislatures, chief executives, and courts) could impair policy 
implementation, creating conflicts about the specific goals that agen-
cies are meant to carry out. Courts in particular, when opposing statu-
tory policy objectives, can restrict the implementation process by ad-
judicating cases according to adverse interpretations of relevant 
statutes.45 
Let us now return to Brazilian competition law. The sudden in-
terruption in the use of employment measures in 2001 seems to yield 
some ambiguity to regulatory outputs, as CADE had previously de-
clared that employment levels are also to be considered in the merger 
review process.  This inconsistency in decision-making aggravates 
the institutional risk that policies outside the scope of the antitrust 
statute will impact the implementation of regulatory goals pursued by 
the Council.46  The ambiguous antitrust practice in Brazil, regarding 
the role of merger control in the regulation of labor markets, could 
allow labor policies to impair the current implementation of competi-
tion law. 
There is room for two examples here.  In the case Gol/Webjet, 
CADE reviewed in 2012 a merger between two airline companies.47  
Despite the expected economic efficiencies, the Council found that 
this transaction would harm the competition in several markets, so 
that the merger clearance was dependent on remedies to protect con-
sumers from the market power held by the merged firm. Following 
 
 44.  Sabatier and Mazmanian, supra note 42 at 551. 
 45.  See Paul Sabatier & Daniel Mazmanian, The Conditions of Effective Implementation: 
A Guide to Accomplishing Policy Objectives, 5 POLICY ANALYSIS 481–504, 499 
(1979). 
 46.  Cf. Sabatier and Mazmanian, supra note 42 at 552. 
          (explaining that the implementation of statutory provisions by agencies is frequently 
affected by other policy goals). 
 47.  Ricardo Ruiz, Gol Linhas Aéreas S/A e Webjet Linhas Aéreas S/A Ato de Concen-
tração [Gol Airlines and Webjet Airtlines Act of Concentration], CADE    (Dec. 11, 
2012), 
https://www.senado.gov.br/comissoes/cas/ap/AP20121211_RicardoMachadoRuiz.pdf. 
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the merger review, after the transaction had been completed in com-
pliance with CADE’s approval conditions, the acquired firm had 50% 
of its employees discharged.48 
In response, the Labor Prosecution Service has brought a civil 
action against the merging firms, claiming that the layoff amounted 
to unlawful discharge in violation to labor laws.  After a first trial de-
cision and appeal proceedings, the reviewing court of the Brazilian 
Labor Judiciary eventually found the layoff to be illegal.  The appel-
late court also declared − though not as the primary ground for its 
ruling − that the protection of workers against mass layoffs is an im-
plicit condition to antitrust clearance of mergers.49  Regardless of the 
merger remedies designed by CADE, the labor courts’ reading of the 
antitrust legislation would somehow extend the reach of the competi-
tion policy to labor markets as well. 
A second example, Fisher/Citrovita, is a merger case involving 
two large orange processing companies, reviewed by CADE in 
2011.50  Because the transaction was found to have anticompetitive 
effects on the demand-side of markets for raw fruit, the conditions for 
merger clearance were remedies meant to control the market power 
held by the merged firm, so as to protect orange farmers and, indi-
rectly, consumers.  After the merger review, a plant was shut down 
due to an internal reorganization of the processing companies and 
173 employees were discharged.51 
This time, the Labor Prosecution Service responded by initiating 
an administrative proceeding to investigate whether CADE could be 
held liable for mass layoffs resulting from mergers approved by the 
antitrust agency.52  Under allegations that the Council had not coop-
 
 48.  See G1, GOL ANUNCIA FIM DA WEBJET E DESLIGAMENTO DE 850 FUNCIONÁRIOS 
(2012), http://g1.globo.com/economia/negocios/noticia/2012/11/gol-anuncia-fim-da-
webjet-e-desligamento-de-850-funcionarios.html (last visited Oct 14, 2015). 
 49.  See Maria Aparecida Magalhães, Id. 
 50.  Carlos Ragazzo, Fisher S.A. Comércio, Indústria e Agricultura and Citrovita Agro 
Industrial Ltda. [Fisher Trade, Industry and Agriculture and Citrovita Agro Industrial 
Ltda.], CADE (Dec. 14, 2011), http://associtrus.com.br/citrosuco_citrovita.pdf. d. 
 51.  See Gustavo Porto, Citrovita fecha unidade de Matão, interior de São Paulo 
[Citrovita closes unit in Matão, interior of São Paulo], ECONOMIA (Feb. 29, 2012), 
http://economia.estadao.com.br/noticias/negocios,citrovita-fecha-unidade-de-matao-
interior-de-sao-paulo,104529e. 
 52.  See Livia Scocuglia, MPT processa Cade por não entregar docomentos em inquérito 
[MPT sues Cade for failing to deliver documents on legal consultant inquiry], 
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erated with the investigations, the public prosecutor in charge 
brought a legal action in 2013 requesting a court order to access con-
fidential records of merger cases.53  If the investigative proceedings 
are still ongoing, the very authority of CADE’s merger decisions 
could eventually be challenged before labor courts. 
It is worth noting that both cases above do not correspond to the 
typical judicial review situation, i.e., courts judging the legality of 
policy outputs of administrative agencies.  The jurisdiction of the La-
bor Judiciary in Brazil covers disputes related to employment rela-
tions and collective bargaining, and these courts have no power to re-
view the lawfulness of decisions by the antitrust agency.54  
Nevertheless, it seems that the potential conflict between CADE, la-
bor courts, and public prosecutors, if it finally emerges, would impact 
the antitrust implementation much like a shortage of legal resources 
created by unsupportive sovereigns of the agency. 
Considering the analysis above, we now understand the implica-
tions of the broken interplay between merger control and labor mar-
ket regulation in Brazil.  As a solution to that problem, I formulate in 
the next section one possible justification for CADE’s decision to in-
terrupt the use of employment measures.  Such policy justification 
will be devised as an instance of legal argumentation based on eco-
nomic theory. 
II. Policy justification in Antitrust Practice 
A. Merger Control and Antitrust Remedies in Brazil 
At this point, a short review of the antitrust rules regulating 
business transactions under Brazilian jurisdiction will follow.  Be-
cause the 1994 Statute employment measures were applied in merger 
cases, it is important to analyze the differences in relevant disposi-
 
CONSULTOR JURÍDICO (Oct. 8, 2013), http://www.conjur.com.br/2013-out-08/mpt-
processa-cade-negar-documentos-apuracao-dispensa-massa. 
 53.  Livia Scocuglia, MPT PROCESSA CADE POR NÃO ENTREGAR DOCUMENTOS EM 
INQUÉRITO CONSULTOR JURÍDICO (2013), http://www.conjur.com.br/2013-out-08/mpt-
processa-cade-negar-documentos-apuracao-dispensa-massa (last visited Mar 14, 
2015). 
 54.  See, e.g., AMAURI MASCARO NASCIMENTO, CURSO DE DIREITO PROCESSUAL DO 
TRABALHO [Course of Labor Law] (28th ed. 2013) (about the competence of labor 
courts in Brazil). See also, CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 114 
(Braz.); CONSOLIDAÇÃO DAS LEIS DO TRABALHO [C.L.T] art 643 (Braz.). 
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tions of the earlier Statute and those provided by the legislation cur-
rently in force, the 2011 Statute.  This doctrinal analysis will com-
pare the legal standards relevant to design general antitrust remedies 
and particular employment measures. 
In the Brazilian merger regime, transactions are presumed to be 
anticompetitive, and thus subject to review by CADE if each of the 
merging firms meets a statutory threshold of annual turnover.55  Mer-
gers covered by the mandatory notification rule are reviewed in spe-
cific administrative proceedings, under which legal conditions for an-
titrust clearance are verified in a fourfold test.56  As a general rule, 
transactions that eliminate competition in a substantial part of rele-
vant markets, enhance dominant position, or lead to market domi-
nance are forbidden. However, if three specific statutory justifica-
tions are cumulatively observed, anticompetitive transactions can be 
granted a conditional approval by the council. 
In sum, antitrust clearance in Brazilian competition law depends 
on whether the merger under review: (i) does not substantially re-
strain and if it is likely to do so there must be, (ii) specific compensa-
tory efficiencies, (iii) that will not be obtained by less restrictive 
means, and (iv) which can, at some extent, be passed on to consum-
ers.  The legislative reform of 2011, despite establishing a pre-merger 
notification regime in Brazil, has not changed the basic criteria for 
antitrust analysis already provided by the 1994 Statute. 
Compliance with the requirements above, in turn, can be 
achieved through legal measures applied to merging 
firms−consensual or unilaterally determined by CADE−which would 
mitigate likely harms to competition and allow a conditional approval 
to the transaction.57  The 2011 Statute, however, does not provide 
substantive rules about the remedies that can be negotiated between 
the Council and the parties to merger review process.58  In the same 
 
 55.  See Lei No. 12.529, de 30 de Novembro de 2011, art. 88 I and II (Braz.) (the notifica-
tion threshold is based on the annual turnover of the entire corporate group to which 
the merging belongs). See also Portaria Interministerial [MJ/MF], 20 de maio de 2012, 
DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] (Braz.) (the updated figures for the turnover 
threshold are provided by a governmental decree jointly issued by the Ministry of Jus-
tice and the Ministry Finance). 
 56.  See Lei No. 12.529, de 30 de Novembro de 2011, art. 88, §6° (Braz.). 
 57.  See Proença, supra note 29 at 274. 
 58.  DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO, Article 125 (May 31, 2012) (discussing the original bill 
that had specific dispositions about the content of merger control agreements, i.e., the 
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way, the 1994 Statute also lacked specifics on merger remedy design, 
as it provided only broad guidelines, determining that these antitrust 
measures should encompass quantitative or qualitative goals to be 
pursued by the merged firm.59 
As we saw in Section I.A, the 1994 Statute did make reference to 
variations in employment level as a relevant criterion to design mer-
ger remedies.  However, even while the 1994 Statute was in force, 
there was a scarcity of legal material needed to identify CADE’s 
reading of the employment level provisions.  Besides the statements 
presented in the Annual Report for 1996, which take those disposi-
tions as basis for implementing job training programs, there seems to 
be only one antitrust decision addressing the relation between labor 
concerns and the general requirements for merger clearance. 60 
In Ultrafértil v. Fosfértil, a merger case from 1997, the Council 
stated that the statutory provisions about variations in the employ-
ment level should be cautiously interpreted in order to conform to the 
goals of competition policy.61  Accordingly, concerns that anticom-
petitive transactions might affect the employment level in labor mar-
kets would have only two implications for the design of merger rem-
edies.  First, CADE should avoid imposing remedies that may 
produce unemployment.  Second, if the merger under review is likely 
to yield reductions in the workforce of the merged firm, layoffs 
should be duly justified as resulting from efficiencies derived from 
the transaction.62 
Additionally, the Council in Ultrafértil v. Fosfértil affirmed that 
the implementation of job training programs by the merging parties 
cannot be considered a sufficient condition for the approval of anti-
 
legal instrument that formalizes the remedies negotiated between CADE and the merg-
ing parties. However, these provisions were vetoed by the President of the Republic 
because they would reduce the opportunities to consensual resolution of merger cases, 
as the statute wording prevented that firms propose remedies in later stages of the re-
view process. This statutory gap was partially filled by CADE Internal Regulations, 
which establishes the procedure for submitting agreement proposals. These rules, 
however, do not provide criteria for evaluating the content of remedies applied in mer-
ger control).  
 59.  DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO, supra, note 4, at Art. 58. 
 60.  Aarnio, supra note 18.  
 61.  CADE, Ato de Concentração No. 2/1994 (Ultrafértil S.A. Indústria e Comércio de 
Fertilizantes and Fertilizantes Fosfatados - Fosfértil), Relator: Cons. Antonio Fonseca, 
j. 28.07.1997. 
 62.  Id. at 24. 
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competitive transactions.63  Those programs should thus be imposed 
only as a measure subsidiary to remedies aimed at accomplishing the 
general requirements for antitrust clearance.64  It also means, as a fur-
ther implication, that regardless of any employment impact that a 
merger might have, these effects cannot themselves account for the 
remedies applied by CADE. In other words, while consumer welfare 
seems to be the primary concern in Brazilian competition law, work-
er welfare would never be an independent criterion in merger analy-
sis. 
Of course, to fill the gaps in both antitrust statutes, a decisional 
standard to design merger remedies has been developed in CADE’s 
administrative practice.65  As in other jurisdictions, conditional ap-
proval in Brazilian merger control, as a response to anticompetitive 
transactions, is preferred to blocking decisions.66  In Fischer v. Cit-
rovita, a case under the 1994 Statute, the Council stated that before 
reproving a merger under review, it is required to determine whether 
the expected harms to competition can be mitigated by antitrust rem-
edies.67  CADE’s preference for conditional clearance over simply 
blocking mergers is justified because the latter measure, despite pre-
serving competition in the marketplace, completely impedes the real-
ization of efficiencies that may arise even from anticompetitive 
transactions.68 
Also under the 1994 Statute, the Council affirmed in Sadia v. 
Perdigão that the remedies applied to anticompetitive transactions 
should produce maximum social benefits with minimum harm, which 
would correspond to the very purpose of the merger regime in Bra-
zil.69  Thus, conditions for merger clearance have to be chosen in ac-
cordance to a decisional standard that assures that remedies eventual-
 
 63.  Id. 
64.  Id. at 25. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  JORGE FAGUNDES & MARIA M. DA ROCHA, CONCENTRAÇÃO DE EMPRESAS NO DIREITO 
ANTITRUSTE BRASILEIRO: Remédios em Fusões, 221-224 (Jorge Fagundes & Maria M. 
da Rocha, Remédios em Fusões,  in CONCENTRAÇÃO DE EMPRESAS NO DIREITO 
ANTITRUSTE BRASILEIRO , 224 (André M. Gilberto, Censo F. Campilongo, & Juliana 
G. Vilela eds., 2011). (commenting on Brazilian merger review process in comparison 
to merger guidelines from foreign jurisdictions). 
 67.  Ato de Concentração, supra, note 51. 
 68.  Id. at 58-9. See also CADE, Ato de Concentração No. 08012.004423/2009-18 
(Perdigão S.A. and Sadia S.A.), Relator: Cons. Carlos Ragazzo, j. 06.08.2011 at 356. 
 69.  Id. 
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ly adopted are optimal antitrust measures.  Such standard, also adopt-
ed in Rumo v. ALL, a recent case under the 2011 Statute, takes the 
form of a principle of proportionality, developed in CADE’s deci-
sions as a doctrine requiring remedies to be appropriate, necessary, 
and effective to the merger under review.70 
The rationale for a proportionality principle governing merger 
control is that remedies should be designed to reduce, to the extent 
possible, any economic burden imposed on the merging firms and 
society as a whole.  Cost concerns are especially relevant in concrete 
cases because, when designing antitrust remedies, CADE has to de-
cide whether behavioral remedies, structural remedies, or a combina-
tion of both are better able to mitigate the effects of anticompetitive 
transactions.71  Thus, in CADE’s administrative practice, the princi-
ple of proportionality becomes a legal test meant to minimize the so-
cial cost of merger remedies and avoid decisions for conditional 
clearance that eventually reduce the overall efficiency in the mar-
kets.72 
Having reviewed the statutory requirements and the remedial 
standard for antitrust clearance, we can now understand the legal 
framework in which the interplay between merger control and labor 
market regulation took place.  Because my concern is the lack of pol-
icy grounds for the current implementation of Brazilian antitrust law, 
 
 70.  CADE, Ato de Concentração No. 08700.005719/2014-65 (Rumo Logística Operadora 
Multimodal S/A and ALL – América Latina Logística S.A.), Relator: Cons. Gilvandro 
Coelho de Araujo, j. 02.11.2015; Opinion by Cons. Ragazzo, AC 08012.004423/2009-
18, at 356; Erling Hjelmeng, Competition Law Remedies: Striving for Coherence or 
Finding New Ways?, 50 COMMON MARKET LAW REVIEW 1007–1037, 1009 (2013). 
(explaining that the principle of proportionality governs antitrust remedies in European 
Union law). AC 08700.005719/2014-65 at 59-60. See also, CADE, Ato de 
Concentração No. 08700.004065/2012-91 (Qualicorp Administradora de Benefícios 
S.A. and others), Relator: Cons. Ana Frazão, j. 02.04.2014 at 133; CADE, Ato de 
Concentração No. 08700.005447/2013-12 (Kroton Educacional S.A. and Anhanguera 
Educacional Participações S.A.), Relator: Cons. Ana Frazão, j. 05.14.2014 at 363 and 
366.  
71.   Cf. AC 08700.005447/2013-12 at 362-3 (discussing “proportionality” and “low social 
cost,” as relevant criteria for the design of merger remedies). See Fagundes and Rocha, 
supra note 66 at 223. 
 72. William H. Page, Optimal Antitrust Remedies: A Synthesis,  in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS , 255 (Roger D. Blair & D. 
Daniel Sokol eds., 2015). (“[B]oth courts and commentators have recognized that, 
even if private conduct reduces efficiency in a relevant sense, antitrust law should in-
tervene to provide a remedy only if (and to the extent) doing so would improve effi-
ciency.”). 
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this paper has to face the question of how CADE could justify the 
discontinuation of employment measures in merger control.  In this 
regard, although economic and doctrinal analyses are really helpful, 
they are unable to completely answer the question posed above. 
While those two approaches can offer substantial criteria to 
evaluate a shift in Brazilian antitrust policy regarding the design of 
merger remedies, such analyses cannot determine how legal deci-
sions based on economics are correctly argued.  For that reason, what 
I propose in this paper is a normative analysis of arguments that 
could support the decision to interrupt the use of employment 
measures.  Policy justifications for that change in CADE’s adminis-
trative practice are thus considered instances of legal argumentation. 
In any case, legal disputes about the purpose and meaning of an-
titrust law must be settled at least for the present work.  To that end, I 
assume that competition policy in Brazil pursues a set of general 
economic goals including efficiency, consumer welfare, and innova-
tion.73 I also assume that, at first sight, provisions of the antitrust stat-
utes confer authority on CADE to use employment measures as a 
merger remedy specifically designed to regulate labor markets. In-
deed, it is not an unlikely interpretation of Brazilian competition leg-
islation, for, as we already saw in Section I.A, the 1994 Statute ex-
plicitly mentioned “employment level” as a relevant criterion for 
designing merger remedies.74 
Of course, legal rules construed in such a way are certainly not 
indisputable. For my purposes, however, suffice it to say that those 
are possible readings of the antitrust statutes within the Brazilian le-
 
 73.  See, e.g., AC 08012.004423/2009-18 at 356. See also Portaria Conjunta SEAE/SDE 
No. 50, de 1° de agosto de 2001, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 17.08.2001 
(issuing Brazilian Horizontal Merger Review Guidelines), which is still adopted by 
CADE in merger review in even after the reform of the competition legislation. 
 74.  Christopher Townley & Adriana Cardinali, A utilização dos precedentes da União 
Europeia no direito concorrencial brasileiro, DIREITO ECONÔMICO E SOCIAL - 
ATUALIDADES E REFLEXÕES SOBRE DIREITO CONCORRENCIAL, DO CONSUMIDOR, DO 
TRABALHO E TRIBUTÁRIO 127, 160 (João G. Rodas ed., 2012) (in addition to “black-
letter” approaches to legal interpretation, techniques based on the internal coherence of 
law allow that gaps in statutory texts are filled by constitutional clauses underlying a 
particular legal regime. It means that, despite the lack of provisions in the 2011 Statute 
about the content of merger remedies, open-textured principles derived from the Bra-
zilian Constitution, such as the promotion of full employment (art. 170, IV), could be-
come the legal basis for the implementation of employment measures in merger con-
trol).  
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gal community.  As stated in the Introduction, I claim that if CADE 
is to justify its implementation choice to abandon employment 
measures in competition law, it should be aware of potential logical 
flaws in arguments based on economic theory.  Accordingly, I ex-
plain below which form of legal argumentation may become falla-
cious as a policy justification for interrupting the interplay between 
merger control and labor market regulation. 
B. Employment Measures and the Inefficiency Thesis 
Assuming employment measures as a specific kind of merger 
remedy, a necessary implication is that their use will be subjected to 
the same requirements governing merger clearance in Brazilian com-
petition law.  In other words, considering that employment measures 
were adopted to neutralize the anticompetitive impact of transactions 
on labor markets, the general criteria to design antitrust remedies 
must be then equally applied. 
As seen in Section II.A, CADE’s recent decisions have adopted 
a proportionality principle as the remedial standard in merger control.  
If this decisional standard is framed in efficiency terms, however, ar-
guments that justify remedy use can be reconstructed with recourse to 
economic theory.  Drawing an analogy with the economic methods of 
policy analysis, the remedial standard in Brazil can be understood as 
a sort of informal cost-benefit (or perhaps cost-effectiveness) test 
meant to minimize the social costs incurred to promote the ultimate 
goals of competition law.75  Such a cost calculus would include not 
only welfare losses resulting from remedies with inefficient design, 
but also administrative costs associated with monitoring the compli-
ance by firms and possible litigation against CADE’s merger deci-
sions.76 
 
 75.  LUCIA HELENA SALGADO & EDUARDO BIZZO DE P. BORGES, ANÁLISE DE IMPACTO 
REGULATÓRIO: UMA ABORDAGEM EXPLORATÓRIA (TEXTO PARA DISCUSSÃO N. 1463) 12 
(2010), http://repositorio.ipea.gov.br/handle/11058/2669 (last visited Sep 24, 2015).; 
STEPHEN DAVIES & BRUCE LYONS, MERGERS AND MERGER REMEDIES IN THE EU: 
ASSESSING THE CONSEQUENCES FOR COMPETITION 11–12 (2008).; E. Thomas Sullivan, 
Antitrust Remedies in the US and EU: Advancing a Standard of Proportionality, 48 
ANTITRUST BULL. 377, 378 and 394-395 (2003).  
 76.  Joseph Farrell, Negotiation and Merger Remedies: Some Problems,  in MERGER 
REMEDIES IN AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN UNION COMPETITION LAW 95 (François 
Levéque & Howard Shelanski eds., 2004). See Howard A. Shelanski & J. Gregory 
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That said, let us focus now on welfare losses, which seem to be a 
more appealing policy justification.77  Accordingly, one possible jus-
tificatory reason for abandoning employment measures in 2001 is 
that these remedies fail the legally required cost-benefit test.78  Elabo-
rating on that argument, it could be said that these employment 
measures fail that legal test because of their over-inclusive design.  
To put it briefly, this would mean that those antitrust measures are 
excessively broad in scope, seeking to correct market failures even in 
absence of significant market power. 
Following this line of reasoning, employment measures are con-
sidered unreasonable remedies because labor markets would be suffi-
ciently competitive.  A merger between employing firms is unlikely 
to create market power at the demand-side of the industry, i.e., mo-
nopsony power over workers.79  In this context, clearance conditions 
imposed by CADE only distort economic incentives and increase the 
productive costs of the merged firm, affecting the markets as sort of 
indirect tax.80  With that argument, one could allege that CADE 
should not apply employment measures, as they would lead to wel-
fare losses, viz., inefficient outcomes in the labor markets in which 
 
Sidak, Antitrust Divestiture in Network Industries, 68 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO 
LAW REVIEW 1–99, 5 and 19 (2001).  
 77.  CADE, Ato de Concentração No. 08700.009198/2013-34 (Estácio Participações S.A. 
e TCA Investimento em Participações Ltda.), Relator: Cons. Ana Frazão, j. 
14.05.2014; and AC 08700.005447/2013-12. Cf. MOTTA, supra note 3 at 296. (of 
course, we one could also say employment measures entail such high administrative 
costs that these measures would fail que cost-effectiveness test regardless of concrete 
welfare losses resulted from their design. However, even though monitoring employ-
ment measures is expensive, as it would be for any behavioral remedy, recent mergers 
cases have demonstrated that CADE is, to some extent, willing to incur such adminis-
trative costs. More generally, about the increasing use of behavioral remedies). See 
John E. Kwoka & Diana L. Moss, Behavioral Merger Remedies: Evaluation and Im-
plications for Antitrust Enforcement, 57 THE ANTITRUST BULLETIN 979–1011, 980 
(2012). (“Behavioral remedies are now endorsed more widely for vertical mergers, 
where current policy is commendably more active than in the past. Moreover, their po-
tential use would not seem to be restricted to vertical cases.”). 
 78.  Kwoka and Moss, supra note 77 at 980..  
 79.  See ROGER D BLAIR & JEFFREY L HARRISON, MONOPSONY IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 41 
(2010). 
 80.  Willem Boshoff et al., The Economics of Public Interest Provisions in South African 
Competition Policy,  in 6TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON COMPETITION LAW, ECONOMICS 
AND POLICY , 16 (2012), http://www.compcom.co.za/sixth-annual-competition-
conference/ (last visited May 24, 2015). 
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the merged firm operates.81  This particular policy justification is 
called here the Inefficiency Thesis. 
Framing the proportionality principle in merger control as a re-
medial standard based on economic concepts is helpful because the 
Inefficiency Thesis can then be analyzed as an argument produced by 
EAL.  In fact, as we saw in the Introduction, the Inefficiency Thesis 
presented above is the hypothetical argument that I claim to be falla-
cious, and which is going to be refuted by the end of this paper.  Be-
fore proceeding, there are still some caveats to be made. 
Because my paper covers topics in antitrust policy, it incorpo-
rates some economic concepts from the theories of imperfect compe-
tition and market power.  However, even though economic analysis 
of competition law is crucial, I am interested in EAL; not as a re-
search method for applied microeconomics, but as a form legal ar-
gumentation based on theoretical insights derived from economic 
models.82  EAL is taken as a technique to construct consequentialist 
arguments supported by prognoses about behavioral reactions to legal 
decisions that change economic incentives.83 
This kind of consequentialist argumentation based on economic 
theory84 (“EAL argumentation”) is somewhat similar to the tradition-
al purposive or teleological approaches to statutory interpretation, 
commonly utilized for legal analysis in both civil and common law 
 
 81.  Cf. Page, supra Page, supra note 72 at 266.. (“Injunctions [antitrust remedies] are 
costly to implement, both in the direct costs of administration and the indirect costs of 
deterring efficient conduct.”) (emphasis added). 
 82.  Cf. Christian Courtis, El Juego de los Juristas: Ensayo de Caracterización de la 
Investigación Dogmática,  in OBSERVAR LA LEY : ENSAYOS SOBRE METODOLOGÍA DE 
LA INVESTIGACIÓN JURÍDICA 105–156 (Christian Courtis ed., 2006). (referring to EAL 
as an empirical-consequentialist method in doctrinal analysis). Cf. Sartor, supra note 
22 at 249. (referring to the idea of a dialectical protocol for legal reasoning, such as the 
one offered by Alexy’s theory of legal argumentation).  
 83.  Cf. Péter Cserne, Courts and Expertise: Consequence-Based Arguments in Judicial 
Reasoning,  in NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS AND GLOBALIZATION 89–109, 95 (Pierre La-
rouche & Péter Cserne eds., 2013). (“An efficiency-based argument, i.e. a judicial ref-
erence to improvements in efficiency or welfare the decision is supposed to bring 
about is an argument based on behavioural consequences.”). 
 84.  Cf. Pargendler and Salama, supra note 25., at 446 (“Economic insights illuminate le-
gal interpretation not only when the law implicates economic concepts . . . but also 
when the legal principles or rules in question call for a forecast of the likely conse-
quences of certain events or legal regimes.”). See Cserne, supra note 13, at 38. 
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jurisdictions.85  EAL argumentation, however, is more rigorous than 
general legal arguments in regards to alleged causalities between law 
and economic outcomes. 86  In fact, the possibility of introducing 
economic knowledge into legal reasoning, as propositions derived 
from empirically-tested models, represents EAL’s best contribution 
to legal scholarship.87 
Yet, as we will see, the Inefficiency Thesis cannot be considered 
a sound EAL argument as it does not survive a critical testing under a 
model of dialectical argumentation.  My claim challenges the ineffi-
ciency thesis only within the argumentative realm of legal discourse.  
What I do not claim is that employment measures are economically 
inefficient as matter of fact, let alone that this paper can demonstrate 
or empirically quantify any loss in social welfare. 
III. Law, Economics and Argumentation 
A. Evaluative Framework: Pragma-dialectics 
To determine the conditions of plausibility for EAL argumenta-
tion and to defend my claim against the inefficiency thesis, I adopt as 
evaluative framework a general theory of argumentation: the prag-
ma-dialectics of van Eemeren and Grootendorst.88  The advantage of 
the pragma-dialectical theory is that it offers a normative model of 
critical discussions that accounts for the empirical aspects of argu-
 
 85.  Cf. Eveline T. Feteris, A Pragma-Dialectical Approach of the Analysis and Evalua-
tion of Pragmatic Argumentation in a Legal Context, 16 ARGUMENTATION 349–367, 
357 (2002). (“In a legal context pragmatic argumentation is often used to defend a tel-
eological interpretation, an interpretation that establishes the meaning of a legal rule 
by determining the goal of the rule.”) (emphasis in original). 
 86.  Cf. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 3 (6 ed. 2012). (“Eco-
nomics generally provides a behavioral theory to predict how people respond to 
laws.”). See also Bruno Salama, O que é Pesquisa em Direito e Economia?, 22 
CADERNOS DIREITO GV, 14 (2008), 
http://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/dspace/handle/10438/2811 (last visited May 23, 2015). 
 87.   See Christian Kirchner, The Difficult Reception of Law and Economics in Germany, 
11 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 277–292, 287 (1991). 
 88.  See FRANS H. VAN EEMEREN & ROB GROOTENDORST, A SYSTEMATIC THEORY OF 
ARGUMENTATION THE PRAGMA-DIALECTICAL APPROACH (2003), for an introduction to 
pragma-dialectical theory; See generally Eveline T. Feteris, A Dialogical Theory of 
Legal Discussions: Pragma-dialectical Analysis and Evaluation of Legal Argumenta-
tion, 8 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LAW 115–135 (2000). 
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mentation also as a linguistic phenomenon.89  Under this approach, 
discussants’ argumentative moves are characterized as speech acts in 
a communicative practice, which are subjected to rationality re-
quirements derived from dialectics.90  Thus argumentation is a “ver-
bal, social, and rational activity aimed at convincing a reasonable 
critic of the acceptability of a standpoint by putting forward a con-
stellation of propositions justifying or refuting the proposition ex-
pressed in the standpoint.”91  While argumentation as communicative 
activity corresponds to a complex speech act, an argument is a set of 
propositions forwarded as reasons to support or oppose the stand-
point under dispute.92 
The model proposed by the pragma-dialectics is divided into 
four analytical stages of critical discussion: confrontation, opening, 
argumentation and conclusion.  These stages are instrumental to the 
general purpose of argumentation: the resolution of a dispute on the 
merits.93  Each stage is governed by rules that determine the proce-
dure for an exchange of views between two rational arguers – actual 
or hypothetical.94  The most basic pragma-dialectical rules assure, for 
instance, that the difference of opinion between discussants is clearly 
 
 89.  See FRANS H. VAN EEMEREN & ROB GROOTENDORST, SPEECH ACTS IN 
ARGUMENTATIVE DISCUSSIONS: A THEORETICAL MODEL FOR THE ANALYSIS OF 
DISCUSSIONS DIRECTED TOWARDS SOLVING CONFLICTS OF OPINION (2010)., for an ex-
tensive exposition of the theoretical basis on which pragma-dialectics is built. 
 90.  See FRANS H. VAN EEMEREN & ROB GROOTENDORST, ARGUMENTATION, 
COMMUNICATION, AND FALLACIES: A PRAGMA-DIALECTICAL PERSPECTIVE 9 (1992). 
 91.  EEMEREN AND GROOTENDORST, supra note 11 at 1. Cf. Erik C. W. Krabbe, Book Re-
view, 21 ARGUMENTATION 101–113, 101 (2007). (reviewing JAMES B. FREEMAN, 
ACCEPTABLE PREMISES: AN EPISTEMIC APPROACH TO AN INFORMAL LOGIC PROBLEM 
(2005)) (“[T]he acceptability question, i.e., the question whether there is a presump-
tion for this premise and how we may ascertain its presumptive character, is of para-
mount importance when the argument is to be evaluated according to standards of in-
formal . . . logic.”). 
 92.  See EEMEREN AND GROOTENDORST, supra note 90 at 13.106Id. at 106.relevance of 
informal logics as a complement to the pragma-dialectical theory of fallacies); See, 
e.g., DOUGLAS N. WALTON, INFORMAL LOGIC: A PRAGMATIC APPROACH (2 ed. 2008).; 
DOUGLAS N. WALTON, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRITICAL ARGUMENTATION (2006). 
 93.  See EEMEREN AND GROOTENDORST, supra note 90 at 35. 
94. Cf. EEMEREN AND GROOTENDORST, supra note 11 at 59. (affirming that a monologue can 
be dialectically analyzed as a critical discussion between a protagonist and an implicit 
antagonist). 
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determined and that both of them share common starting points need-
ed to carry out the debate.95 
In respect to the argumentation stage, the model for critical dis-
cussions includes evaluative criteria to assess the sufficiency and 
success of argumentative moves that defend or attack a standpoint.96  
To evaluate whether arguments advanced in critical discussions are 
sound, the pragma-dialectical framework offers two analytical tools: 
argumentation schemes and critical questions.  An argumentation 
scheme expresses a “more or less conventionalized way of represent-
ing the relation between what is stated in the argument in what is 
stated in the standpoint.”97  As a concept, argumentation schemes are 
abstract frames based on particular ways of linking up propositions.  
Such recognized argumentative forms warrant that the acceptability 
of the premises of an argument is transferred to its conclusion, so that 
the standpoint under dispute also becomes acceptable to the discus-
sants.98 
There are three main argumentative schemes in the pragma-
dialectical theory: causal, symptomatic, and comparison argumenta-
tion.99  The first scheme justifies the acceptability of a standpoint by 
relying on a sense of instrumentality between premises and conclu-
sion of the argument.  That is to say, the causal scheme expresses a 
relation of means and ends in which the propositions advanced as 
premises are the cause for the effect indicated in the proposition re-
ferred to as a standpoint defended by the arguer.100 
In the scheme of symptomatic argumentation, there is a relation 
of concomitance between the propositions, what allows the accepta-
bility of the arguments to be transferred to the standpoint.  This 
means the premises of an argument express a sign or a characteristic 
pertinent to the conclusion so that the discussants accept this proposi-
tion.101  Finally, in comparison argumentation, the scheme relies on a 
relation of analogy between arguments and standpoint so that the 
 
 95. Cf. EEMEREN AND GROOTENDORST, supra note 17 at 151 (presenting a detailed descrip-
tion of the code of conduct for rational discussants). 
 96. See Id. at 162. 
 97. EEMEREN AND GROOTENDORST, supra note 90 at 96. 
 98. See EEMEREN AND GROOTENDORST, supra note 11 at 4. 
 99.  See Id. at 4. 
 100.  See EEMEREN AND GROOTENDORST, supra note 90 at 97. 
 101.  See Id. at 97. 
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similarity of premises and conclusion accounts for the acceptability 
of the proposition under dispute.102 
Each of the general schemes carries a specific dialectical test 
corresponding to questions that arguers are committed to answer 
when using those argumentation forms in a rational debate.103  Thus, 
the model for critical discussions requires not only that argumenta-
tion schemes are appropriately chosen, but also correctly employed, 
so that doubts and criticism by the respondent are really faced by the 
proponent of an argument.104  Most importantly, the violation of the 
pragma-dialectical rules at the argumentation stage – or any other 
discussion stage – may constitute a fallacy. Fallacies in pragma-
dialects are understood as incorrect argumentative moves that threat 
the resolution of a dispute on the merits.105 
Nonetheless, although the purpose of critical discussions is al-
ways to resolve disputes over the acceptability of a standpoint, the 
conflicts to be handled via argumentation include, besides differences 
of opinion, also practical problems or unproven theoretical hypothe-
ses.106 In fact, the diversity of goals, and respective conventions ob-
served in concrete communicative practices, become contextual ele-
ments that are essential to evaluate whether discussion moves 
conform to the dialectical protocol.107 
Along with argumentation schemes and respective critical ques-
tions, the identification of fallacies also depends on the particular 
context of each kind of argumentative discussion.108  In this respect, I 
believe the concept of argumentative activity type as a descriptive 
category in pragma-dialectics becomes rather similar to the typology 
 
 102.  See Id. at 97. 
 103.  See FRANS H. VAN EEMEREN, BART GARSSEN & BERT MEUFFELS, FALLACIES AND 
JUDGMENTS OF REASONABLENESS 167 (2009). 
 104.  See EEMEREN AND GROOTENDORST, supra note 90 at 158 and 162. 
 105.  Id. at 102. 
 106.  Cf. Douglas N. Walton, What is Reasoning? What Is an Argument?, 87 THE JOURNAL 
OF PHILOSOPHY 399–419, 411 (1990). (explaining how different conflicts may origi-
nate specific kinds of argumentation). 
 107.  See Frans van Eemeren et al., Contextual Considerations in the Evaluation of Argu-
mentation, in DIALECTICS, DIALOGUE AND ARGUMENTATION: AN EXAMINATION OF 
DOUGLAS WALTON’S THEORIES OF REASONING 115, 129 (Chris Reed & Christopher W. 
Tindale eds., 2010). 
 108.  Cf. Frans H. van Eemeren, In Context, 25 ARGUMENTATION 141–161, 155 (2011). 
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of dialogue models formulated by Walton.109  For that reason, my 
evaluative framework also includes contextual elements related to di-
alogues of persuasion (about differences in opinion), deliberation 
(about practical problems), inquiry (about theoretical hypothesis) and 
even information-seeking (to exchange knowledge).110 
In real-life argumentative discourses, disputes about a given 
standpoint usually evolve to several new sub-disputes over accepta-
bility of other relevant propositions.111  Thus, framing disputes and 
sub-disputes in dialogue types becomes useful to identify fallacious 
moves within the critical discussion model.112 Walton dialogues 
would allow us to describe, even in general manner, some kinds of 
dialectical interaction between discussants and their specific goals in 
an argumentative discussion.113  Argumentation in traditional doctri-
 
 109.  It is true that Walton’s approach to dialogue types, as different normative models of 
dialectical argumentation, has been criticized as theoretically flawed and incompatible 
with pragma-dialectics, see Frans H. van Eemeren & Peter Houtlosser, The Contextu-
ality of Fallacies, 27 INFORMAL LOGIC 59–68 (2007). However, even adopting the 
pragma-dialectical theory in this paper, I believe the analytical insights derived from 
dialogue types are helpful if interpreted as contextual criteria equivalent to those of-
fered by concept of argumentative activity type proposed by Eemeren. Cf. Eemeren et 
al., supra note 90 at 131 (“[T]he incorporation of contextual factors at the activity type 
level in the pragma-dialectical method for analyzing and evaluating argumentative 
discourse always involves [. . .] a set of contextual criteria to relate the phenomena that 
are examined with the theoretical framework.”). In fact, despite the critique from 
Eemeren and others, Walton seems to consider the critical discussion model as the ba-
sis for his own analyses, incorporating both the discussion rules and stages from the 
pragma-dialectics literature. See Christopher W. Tindale, Fallacies, Blunders, and Di-
alogue Shifts: Walton’s Contributions to the Fallacy Debate, 11 ARGUMENTATION 
341–354, 334 (1997).  
 110.  Cf. Douglas Walton & Giovanni Sartor, Teleological Justification of Argumentation 
Schemes, 27 ARGUMENTATION 111–142, 128 (2013). (summarizing the seven dialogue 
types formulated by Walton and others). The advantage of partially including the dia-
logue types in my framework is that it allows me to utilized important analyses of the 
legal argumentative practice which are based on that particular dialogical approach. 
See, e.g., Fabrizio Macagno, Douglas Walton & Giovanni Sartor, Argumentation 
Schemes for Statutory Interpretation,  in LEGAL KNOWLEDGE AND INFORMATION 
SYSTEMS: JURIX 2014 (R. Hoekstra ed., 2014). For an example of argumentative 
analysis that also combines Walton’s contributions with pragma-dialectics, see Jean H. 
M. Wagemans, The Assessment of Argumentation from Expert Opinion, 25 
ARGUMENTATION 329–339, 337 (2011). 
 111.  See EEMEREN AND GROOTENDORST, supra note 90 at 42. 
 112.  Cf. Tindale, supra note 109 at 344. (“In identifying a wider range of dialogues in 
which argumentation occurs, Walton widens the scope for the occurrence and treat-
ment of fallacies.”). 
 113.  See Walton, supra note 106 at 413. 
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nal scholarship, for instance, despite initially characterized as an in-
quiry dialogue, can shift to a persuasion dialogue, as legal scholars, 
instead of arguing only to produce practical knowledge, also strive to 
achieve a common view regarding propositions about law.114 
When it comes to EAL argumentation, it seems that argumenta-
tive discourse always shifts, at some point, from dialogues of inquiry 
or persuasion to an information-seeking dialogue about the economic 
consequences of legal decisions.  It happens because, while arguing 
to convince each other about the acceptability of propositions, legal 
discussants can always rely on an implicit dialogue with authoritative 
sources of knowledge.  In the next section, I employ argumentation 
schemes and appropriate dialogue types to evaluate uses of econom-
ics in legal reasoning.  Such a pragma-dialectical approach will re-
veal how to avoid fallacious discussion moves based on the authority 
of economic science. 
B. Pragma-dialectical Approach to EAL Argumentation 
From a pragma-dialectical perspective, the discourse of EAL ar-
gumentation can be represented as a long argumentative chain,115 
which has, as basic constitutive elements, both consequentialist and 
authority arguments.  These two forms of argumentation, in turn, are 
identified with the logical structures of causal and symptomatic 
schemes, respectively.116  Let us begin by examining the consequen-
tialist argument and then move on to the authority argument. Follow-
ing this analysis, we will be able to understand why such authority 
element becomes key to the plausibility of the chain of legal argu-
ments produced by EAL. 
Consequentialist arguments themselves have a complex logical 
structure.  Among their premises there are at least (i) one practical-
evaluative proposition stating the (in)desirability of some state of af-
fairs, which is to be achieved by a given course of action; and (ii) one 
 
 114.  Cf., e.g., Sartor, supra note 22. (“In practical inquiry [about law], defining what 
counts as winning or losing depends on the purposes of each participant, [. . .] on 
whether they want to achieve an agreement, or rather to increase their individual 
knowledge or [. . .] collective practical knowledge.”). 
 115.  Cf. WALTON, supra note 92 at 24. (“[C]hains of argumentation are made up of smaller 
arguments that are connected together. The conclusion of one inference [argument] 
becomes a premise in another one.”). 
 116.  See EEMEREN AND GROOTENDORST, supra note 90 at 160. 
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theoretical-descriptive, or theoretical-predictive, proposition about a 
causal link between the course of action and factual consequences 
that constitute the desired state of affairs.  The conclusion of the ar-
gument is a practical-normative proposition suggesting that certain 
decision should (or should not) be made because the course of action 
would promote the (in)desirable state of affairs.117 
According to Feteris, consequentialist arguments in law, as dis-
cussion moves meant to support of a given reading of legal texts, can 
be analyzed within the following logical structure: 
Premise 1: The consequence Y is (un)desirable. 
Premise 2: The enforcement of the provision X under the inter-
pretation X’ leads to the consequence Y. 
Conclusion: The enforcement of the provision X under the inter-
pretation X’ is (un)desirable.118 
In critical discussions about legal theses, the soundness of a con-
sequentialist argument bears on how the arguer answers critical ques-
tions regarding the desirability of a given state of affairs in terms of 
values and goals to be promoted by the law.  Additionally, the 
soundness of that argument depends also on the response to questions 
challenging the causal link, e.g., as a matter of probabilistic infer-
ence, that always underlies the consequentialist argumentation.  
While the first kind of critical question can be answered with re-
course to doctrines and interpretive arguments, typical forms of legal 
argumentation would not provide reasons to justify the causality be-
tween social facts.119  And that is when EAL plays a major role in le-
gal reasoning.120 
 
 117.  See Eveline T. Feteris, The Rational Reconstruction of Argumentation Referring to 
Consequences and Purposes in the Application of Legal Rules: A Pragma-Dialectical 
Perspective, 19 ARGUMENTATION 459–470, 463 (2006). About the distinction between 
practical (evaluative or normative) statements and theoretical (descriptive or predic-
tive) statements, my classification was partially build on ALEKSANDER PECZENIK, ON 
LAW AND REASON 34 (2009). 
 118.  Cf. Feteris, supra note 117 at 462. 
 119.  According to Feteris, such legal arguments “consists of symptomatic argumentation 
justifying the desirability of consequence Y by referring to the fact that it is compati-
ble with goal Z which is objectively prescribed by the valid legal order.” Eveline T. 
Feteris, The Pragma-dialectical Reconstruction of Teleological-evaluative Argumenta-
tion in Complex Structures of Legal Justification,  in DISSENSUS AND THE SEARCH FOR 
COMMON GROUND: OSSA 2007 , 3 (H.V. Hansen et al. eds., 2007). 
 120.  Cf. COOTER AND ULEN, supra note 86 at 3. (“Economics provided a scientific theory 
to predict the effects of legal sanctions on behavior.”). 
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According to mainstream (neoclassical) economics, the scientific 
method would allow economists to build theoretical models with fair-
ly accurate predictive power.121  Actually, the possibility that these 
models yield predictions about the behavior of economic actors 
seems to be the fundamental criterion of validity in positive econom-
ics.122  When it comes to economic effects of law, however, EAL can 
go astray in consequentialist arguments if the propositions put for-
ward, describing or predicting the consequences of legal decisions, 
are considered false or, at least, disputable.  If the causal relation be-
tween economic facts, as stated by those propositions, is a belief that 
cannot be derived from the corpus of knowledge produced by the ac-
ademic community, EAL argumentation becomes flawed. 
In that case, once the arguer advances propositions that might 
not be considered true, the appeal to the authority of economics be-
comes an unreasonable recourse to theoretical knowledge in critical 
discussions.  Because such discussion move violates the pragma-
dialectical rules, that argument from authority turns out to become an 
informal fallacy known as argumentum ad verecundiam.123  Moreo-
ver, as one element in a chain of legal arguments, fallacious appeals 
to economic knowledge could undermine the entire EAL argumenta-
tion.  That said, there can be, of course, sound appeals to the expert 
opinion of economists, which are acceptable argumentative moves in 
a debate about legal theses. 
Let us see now the basic structure of a plausible argument from 
authority.  It comprises three theoretical premises stating that (i) the 
source consulted is an expert in a relevant field of knowledge; (ii) the 
source of expert knowledge asserts that a given proposition is true (or 
 
 121.  Cf. Daniel M. Hausman, Economic Methodology in a Nutshell,  THE JOURNAL OF 
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 115–127, 121 (1989). (recognizing that Milton Friedman’s 
approach, as the standard methodology for neoclassical economics, is representative of 
Popper’s model of positivist science). 
 122.  Cf. MILTON FRIEDMAN, ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 8–9 (1953). (“[T]heory is to 
be judged by its predictive power for the class of phenomena which it is intended to 
‘explain’[. . .] the only relevant test of the validity of a hypothesis is comparison of its 
predictions with experience. The hypothesis is rejected if its predictions are contra-
dicted.”). 
 123.  Cf. Donald N. McCloskey, Rhetoric of Law and Economics, The, 86 MICH. L. REV. 
752–767, 766 (1987). (suggesting that ad verecundiam arguments occur in economic 
analysis of law); and Donald N. McCloskey, The Rhetoric of Economics,  JOURNAL OF 
ECONOMIC LITERATURE 481–517, 500 (1983). (suggesting that economists employ ad 
verecundiam arguments). 
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false); and (iii) the proposition asserted in the expert opinion belongs 
to the area of expertise of the source.  The conclusion of the argu-
ment is yet another theoretical proposition, which states that the 
proposition asserted in the expert opinion may plausibly be accepted 
as true (or false).124  Because arguments from authority are based on 
the general symptomatic scheme, the fact that the expert consulted is 
an authoritative source of knowledge is taken as a sign that her ad-
vice can be considered correct and acceptable. 
Following Walton, arguments from authority, or appeals to ap-
peals to expert opinion − as they are also known in the literature − 
can be analyzed within the logical structure below:125 
Premise 1: The source X is an expert in the field of knowledge 
Y. 
Premise 2: The source X asserts that the proposition Z is known 
to be true (false). 
Premise 3: The proposition Z is within area of knowledge Y. 
Conclusion: The proposition Z may (plausibly) be taken to be 
true (false). 
To explain the conditions of plausibility for the argument from 
authority, I move back to the dialogue typology mentioned above in 
Section III.A.  According to Walton, the dialectical interaction with a 
source of authority in argumentative discussions should be under-
stood as a mix of persuasion and information-seeking dialogues.126  
This kind interaction involves a dialogue between lay discussants, 
who resort to an expert opinion to justify a standpoint, and another 
secondary dialogue that allows an exchange of information between a 
layperson and the authoritative source of knowledge.127 
The information exchange does not really need to take place, 
though, and it is often only assumed as a pre-condition for adopting 
an expert opinion in a debate between rational arguers. Nonetheless, 
actual or presumed, the information-seeking dialogue allows us to 
identify the conditions for a plausible appeal to the authority of sci-
ence.128  Because a layperson, as a participant in the information-
 
 124.  See Wagemans, supra note 110 at 335. 
 125.  See DOUGLAS N. WALTON, APPEAL TO EXPERT OPINION: ARGUMENTS FROM 
AUTHORITY 258 (1997). 
 126.  See Id. at 121. 
 127.  See Id. at 121. 
 128.  See Id. at 122. 
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seeking dialogue, cannot assess the content of an expert opinion, the 
evaluation of arguments from authority requires logical criteria not 
related to the relevant field of knowledge.  The critical testing of 
propositions advanced by experts inevitably relies on questions that 
refer only indirectly to the opinion asserted.129 
Accordingly, to evaluate arguments from authority, Walton pro-
poses critical questions about personal aspects of the expert, such as 
her credibility and reliability, the relevance of her expertise, and the 
accuracy of her advice.130  These questions can be summarized in the 
following six topics: 
1. Expertise: How credible is X as a source of expert 
knowledge? 
2. Field: Is X a source in the field of expert knowledge that the 
proposition Z is in? 
3. Opinion: What did the source X assert that implies the propo-
sition Z? 
4. Trustworthiness: Is the source X personally reliable as an ex-
pert in the field Y? 
5. Consistency: Is the proposition Z consistent with what other 
experts in the field Y assert? 
6. Backup Evidence: Is the proposition Z based on evidence? 
The critical questions above can also be understood as referring 
to unexpressed premises of the argument from authority, which al-
lows us to expend its basic logical structure.131  If an arguer fails to 
properly answer one of those questions, it means that assumptions on 
which the appeal to expert opinion is based were violated.  Lacking 
some of those premises, an argument from authority loses plausibly 
and may become an ad verecundiam fallacy.132 
 
 129.  See Wagemans, supra note 110 at 338. 
 130.  See WALTON, supra note 125 at 223.  
 131.  See Douglas Walton & Chris Reed, Diagramming, Argumentation Schemes and Criti-
cal Questions,  in ANYONE WHO HAS A VIEW , 210 (Frans H. van Eemeren et al. eds., 
2003). 
 132.  See WALTON, supra note 125 at 258–259. It is worth noting that, because even experts 
cannot be always right in their judgements, the basis for a sound appeal to authority is, 
in most situations, not deductive or inductive, but merely presumptive reasoning. In 
other words, the acceptability of a standpoint supported by presumptive arguments can 
always be defeated in view of new evidence, which, in turn, can be provided by the 
answers to critical questions. See Douglas Walton, Argumentation Schemes: The Basis 
of Conditional Relevance,  L. REV. MSU-DCL 1205, 1207 (2003). 
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Walton’s questions are useful not only to analyze scientific evi-
dence, such as the expert testimony of economists, but also to evalu-
ate general uses of economic knowledge in legal reasoning.133  That is 
because sources of authority, as defined in argumentation theory, are 
not limited to individual experts.  Actually, those sources include also 
documents, machines and even an entire field of knowledge repre-
sented by a relevant academic community.134  Moreover, appeals to 
authority in written argumentation are equivalent to oral examina-
tions of individual experts in trial, in that both dialectical procedures 
constitute or, at least assume, some kind of information-seeking dia-
logue.135 
Since theoretical propositions in EAL arguments are usually de-
rived from documental material (e.g. reports, technical opinions, sci-
entific papers), a plausible appeal to the authority of economics re-
quires a dialectical interaction with those same sources of 
knowledge.136  That is, an exchange of information through a pre-
sumed dialogue between a legal decision-maker, engaged in EAL ar-
gumentation, and an economist, who is considered an ideal repre-
sentative of the academic community.137  In this case, the expert 
 
 133.  See John L. Solow & Daniel Fletcher, Doing Good Economics in the Courtroom: 
Thoughts on Daubert and Expert Testimony in Antitrust, 31 J. CORP. L. 489, 489 
(2005). As a matter of fact, the critical questions for arguments from authority are 
somewhat similar to the legal criteria employed in courts, such as the Daubert test for 
admissibility of scientific evidence in U.S. law. See David M. Godden & Douglas 
Walton, Argument from Expert Opinion as Legal Evidence: Critical Questions and 
Admissibility Criteria of Expert Testimony in the American Legal System, 19 RATIO 
JURIS 261–286, 281 (2006). 
 134.  See Catherine Hundleby, The Authority of the Fallacies Approach to Argument Eval-
uation, 20 INFORMAL LOGIC 279–308, 298 (2010). See also EEMEREN AND 
GROOTENDORST, supra note 74 at 161 (“The authority appealed need not always be a 
person. It may also be a book [. . .] Another body of authority is the number of people 
who believe something. . .”). 
 135.  See Douglas Walton, Examination Dialogue: An Argumentation Framework for Crit-
ically Questioning an Expert Opinion, 38 JOURNAL OF PRAGMATICS 745–777, 755 
(2006). 
 136.  Cf. William H. Page & John E. Lopatka, Economic Authority and the Limits of Exper-
tise in Antitrust Cases, 90 CORNELL LAW REVIEW 617–704, 619 (2005). (recognizing 
the authority of economics in law “a body of authoritative economic knowledge 
adopted by courts − directly or indirectly − from the scholarly literature.”) (footnote 
omitted). 
 137.  A similar situation would be the typical activity between scholars of writing about and 
commenting on each other’s work. Cf., e.g., Walton, supra note 135 at 765. (referring 
to a philosopher criticizing the writings of another as example of a dialectical interac-
tion that includes presumed information-seeking and persuasion dialogues). 
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economist could be a scholar whose academic work is taken as refer-
ence to propositions put forward when the decision-maker argues 
about the economic consequences of legal decisions.  And that is 
what happens, for instance, when judges and agencies interpret the 
competition legislation.138 
The recourse to the overall authority of a field of knowledge, 
however, downplays critical questions that challenge personal char-
acteristics of the expert, even though assessing these aspects is 
somewhat inevitable.139  For that reason, the plausibility of EAL ar-
gumentation depends mainly on the backup evidence to be offered by 
economist and, most importantly, the consistency of her opinion 
within the economic community.  As we will see in the next section, 
my claim against the Inefficiency Thesis builds on that second logical 
criterion, i.e., the consistency question for arguments from authority. 
C. EAL Argumentation: Criticism and Developments 
My analysis of EAL argumentation, as a chain of arguments 
supported by an element of authority, could be challenged in at least 
two ways.  In this section, I will briefly respond to these points of 
criticism, in an attempt to show that they do not undermine my claim.  
The first of those critiques would contend that the logical criteria rel-
evant to arguments from authority in courts cannot be employed to 
evaluate legal doctrines and statutory interpretation informed by eco-
nomics.  This critique assumes that economic knowledge provided by 
an expert witness is essentially different from the theoretical insights 
that EAL offers to legal analysis.140  In this way, Walton’s account of 
appeals to expert opinion in judicial settings would not be able to ex-
plain the conditions for plausible EAL arguments. 
It is a weak criticism.  Knowledge produced outside legal dis-
course is useful  when judges engage in legal interpretation to decide 
 
 138.  See, e.g., Ioannis Lianos, “Judging” Economists: Economic Expertise in Competition 
Law Litigation,  in THE REFORM OF EC COMPETITION LAW: NEW CHALLENGES , 237 
(Ioannis Kokkoris & Ioannis Lianos eds., 2010). 
 139.  Cf. EEMEREN AND GROOTENDORST, supra note 90 at 161. (“[B]ecause [. . .] a written 
source derives its status from its spiritual progenitor [. . .] here, too, authority is ulti-
mately ascribed to a person.”). 
 140.  Cf., e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of the Economic Expert Wit-
ness, 13 THE JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 91–99, 91 (1999). 
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on the content of law.141 It is also useful when they argue to justify 
decisions about which facts of the case are considered proven.142  It 
means that, whether legal decision-makers are called on to determine 
the admissibility and sufficiency of evidence, or the relevant law to 
the case, scientific knowledge is always incorporated into legal rea-
soning as propositions about the empirical world. 
To understand my point, one must recognize that, even though 
legal reasoning is practical in nature, it has a particular theoretical 
dimension as well.143  Let us consider the kind of argumentation that 
takes place in court.  Indeed, we can find in judicial discourse both 
practical arguments, which are meant to justify a course of action144 
(e.g. a legal decision).  We can also find judicial discourse in  theo-
retical arguments, which are meant to justify beliefs145 (e.g. about the 
facts of a case). 
Outside the evidentiary realm of courts, those theoretical legal 
arguments mainly occur in what Atienza called “legislative argumen-
tation.”146  Think of a parliamentary committee responsible for draft-
ing reports on a legislative proposal.  To do so, they could make use 
of scientific knowledge to argue that the bill, once enacted, would 
achieve a certain policy goal. The committee thus appeals to the ex-
 
 141.  See Pargendler and Salama, supra note 25 at 108–109. 
 142. See Neil MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and Practical Reason, 7 MIDWEST STUDIES IN 
PHILOSOPHY 271–286, 272 (1982). In this situation, legal evidence, and particularly 
scientific evidence, becomes a source of theoretical propositions in arguments meant 
to defend a possible description of empirical facts. This kind of reasoning, known as 
inference to the best explanation, allows different propositions to come together to 
support plausible explanatory hypotheses. See Amalia Amaya, Inference to the Best 
Explanation,  in LEGAL EVIDENCE AND PROOF: STATISTICS, STORIES, LOGIC , 135 (Bart 
Verheij, Henry Prakken, & Hendrik Kaptein eds., 2013). 
 143.  Cf. Burton, supra note 14 at 764. (“Law is an exercise in practical reason, to be 
grasped from the internal point of view of an actor.”). See also Finnis, supra note 15 at 
1.See MANUEL ATIENZA, LAS RAZONES DEL DERECHO: TEORÍAS DE LA 
ARGUMENTACIÓN JURÍDICA 23 (2005). See also Scott Brewer, Logocratic Method and 
the Analysis of Arguments in Evidence, 10 LAW, PROBABILITY AND RISK 175–202, 176 
(2011). (explaining how some forms of theoretical argumentation in law, which he 
calls “evidentiary arguments,” are utilized by judges and lawyers). 
 144.  See NEIL MACCORMICK, PRACTICAL REASON IN LAW AND MORALITY 12 (2008). 
 145.  See DOUGLAS N. WALTON, PRACTICAL REASONING: GOAL-DRIVEN, KNOWLEDGE-
BASED, ACTION-GUIDING ARGUMENTATION 84 (1990). 
 146.  See Manuel Atienza, El Argumento de Autoridad en el Derecho,  EL CRONISTA DEL 
ESTADO SOCIAL Y DEMOCRÁTICO DE DERECHO 14–27, 25 (2012). 
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pert opinion of scientists, constructing a theoretical argument to sup-
port a conclusion about the likely effects of the new legislation.147 
Theoretical arguments in legal discourse can be seen, however, 
in yet another situation, viz., when EAL is employ in legal analysis.  
Actually, the authority and consequentialist elements of EAL argu-
mentation, as we saw in Section III.B, reveal the same theoretical as-
pects of legislative arguments based on expert knowledge.148  For in-
stance, when interpreting statutes, legal decision-makers can rely on 
the authority of economics to argue for the acceptability of proposi-
tions that predict causal relations between social facts relevant to the 
law.  The same recourse to the authority of economic science could 
be seen in a legislative report on a bill that addresses some regulatory 
issue.149 
Now we can compare the use of economic evidence and the role 
of EAL in legal reasoning.  In the first case, regardless of the accura-
cy of the expert evidence, economic knowledge become premises in 
theoretical arguments meant to support conclusions about which facts 
– e.g., regarding market behavior –, were proven in court.150  When it 
comes to EAL, similar economic propositions become premises in 
other theoretical arguments, meant, in turn, to support conclusions of 
practical arguments based on the consequences of legal decisions.151  
 
 147.  Cf. Id. at 25. (mentioning the example of a smoking-ban law in Spain and the debate 
about whether scientific studies support that legislation). 
 148.  Atienza considers that the use of expert evidence in courts and scientific studies in 
parliaments can be equally understood as theoretical arguments from authority. My 
point is that EAL argumentation is akin to legislative argumentation due to its prag-
matic rationale, see ATIENZA, supra note 155 at 206. That is, both forms of legal ar-
gumentation are consequentialist and build on predictive propositions that estimate the 
general reaction of individuals towards a statute or judicial decision to be taken. 
 149.  Cf. Godden and Walton, supra note 133 at 276. (affirming that, in legal argumenta-
tion, “the expert will be playing a role in trying to establish one or more of the premis-
es being used in a persuasion dialogue.”). 
 150.  See Id. at 227. (“[E]ven in law, expert testimony cannot conclusively establish the 
acceptability of a proposition.”).; Cf., e.g., Lianos, supra note 138 at 317. (suggesting 
that economic evidence in antitrust cases is evaluated through a comparison between 
different and competing factual explanations about market behavior). See also Michael 
S. Pardo & Ronald J. Allen, Juridical Proof and the Best Explanation, 27 LAW AND 
PHILOSOPHY 223–268, 242 (2008). (“[T]he strength of [the] inference [to the best ex-
planation] will depend contextually on the other evidence, and the presence of other, 
contrary explanation.”). 
 151.  Cf. Giovanni Sartor, Defeasibility in Legal Reasoning,  in INFORMATICS AND THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL REASONING 73–97, 146 (Zenon Bankowski, Ian White, & Ul-
rike Hahn eds., 1995). (explaining that the premises underlying a legal decision, un-
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The acceptability of those theoretical premises, i.e., propositions stat-
ing economic facts and relations, stems from appeals to the authority 
of economics in both cases above.  That is why I believe arguments 
from authority, as a specific argumentative scheme, can be helpful to 
analyze any use of economic knowledge in legal reasoning, including 
expert evidence and EAL. 
A second critique would point out that, once one links the plau-
sibility of EAL argumentation to a consensus among experts, any use 
of economic knowledge in legal reasoning could become logically 
unacceptable at some point, as economists always disagree on how to 
describe or predict market functioning.  An economic opinion can be 
inconsistent with other economists’ views is so commonplace that 
almost every EAL argument could be deemed fallacious.  Following 
this criticism, Walton’s logical criteria to evaluate arguments from 
authority loses much of its analytical power. 
However, while economists – and, for that matter, any academic 
community – have scientific disagreements, it does not mean that 
there is no common theoretical ground capable of informing legal de-
cision-making and regulatory policy.  Think of antitrust law, for in-
stance, and the prevailing influence of neoclassical microeconomic 
theory.  Concepts such as market power, barriers to entry and effi-
ciency are known and equally employed by regulators, firms and 
courts in antitrust litigation.152  I am not saying neoclassical econom-
ics has really contributed to the improvement of antitrust policy, but 
rather that such an economic approach has, to a considerable extent, 
shaped the discourse of competition law.153 
Accordingly, Lianos points out that, despite divergent opinions 
of economists concerning several antitrust issues, economic 
knowledge has nonetheless been incorporated into legal decision-
making in a fairly consistent manner.  The so-called “Economic 
Laws” is a case in point, as “part of general experience and [that] can 
be accepted without the need to be established and explained by ex-
perts.”154  In any case, my approach to EAL argumentation does not 
 
derstood here as conclusion of a practical argument, can include “statutory, judicial, 
doctrinal provisions, factual assertions.”) (emphasis added).   
 152.  See Lianos, supra note 138 at 243. 
 153.  See generally William E. Kovacic & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Policy: A Century of 
Economic and Legal Thinking, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 43–60 (2000). 
 154.  Lianos, supra note 138. 
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suggest that any disagreement among economists yields an ad vere-
cundiam fallacy.  Rather, and this must be clear, my point is only that 
the logical criteria for uses of economic knowledge in law impose 
that such lack of consensus is revealed, what would allow a rational 
debate to be carried out. 
The duty to acknowledge the inconsistency of an expert opinion 
derives from the pragma-dialectical rules, as any argumentative move 
that prevents the resolution of a conflict of opinions is considered a 
violation of the protocol for critical discussions.155  Thus, the recourse 
to an economic opinion that is not consistent within the academic 
community requires the arguer to make explicit the disagreement 
among experts, so that possible critical reactions against the appeal to 
the authority of economics take place.  If the proponent of an argu-
ment from authority refuses to answer critical questions posed to her, 
or deliberately seek to preclude any criticism by presenting the argu-
ment in a dogmatic fashion, then the appeal to expert opinion be-
comes fallacious.156 
The latter situation is particularly relevant here, i.e., when the 
proponent uses the discussion tactic of “suppression of critical ques-
tioning by making the appeal to authority seem more absolute than it 
really is.”157  In this case, the arguer tries to evade the very burden of 
proof which, according to the chosen argumentation scheme, has to 
be satisfied in order to support her standpoint.  Such evasion of the 
burden of proof in dialectical argumentation can only be accom-
plished, though, in concrete contexts, as a result of implicit language 
use by arguers.158  At this point, it is helpful to remember what I said 
earlier about the critical questions: they also correspond to unex-
pressed premises of the argument from authority, which are merely 
assumed in an argumentative discourse. 
When it comes to written argumentation − in which actual ques-
tioning between discussants cannot exist − critical questions become 
the criteria to evaluate the appeal to expert opinion as interpreted 
 
 155.  See supra Section III.A. 
 156.  See WALTON, supra note 125 at 226. In this case, the discussion move by the propo-
nent violates the pragma-dialectical rules governing the use of argumentation schemes. 
See also EEMEREN AND GROOTENDORST, supra note 11 at 172. 
 157.  WALTON, supra note 125 at 252. 
 158.  See EEMEREN AND GROOTENDORST, supra note 11 at 181. 
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from the argumentative text.159  In other words, these criteria deter-
mine whether the logical structure of that argument, reconstructed by 
the interpreter to include all relevant premises, renders the appeal to 
authority really plausible.160  For that reason, the proponent of an 
EAL argument (e.g. a court) would only be able to avoid an ad vere-
cundiam fallacy if she anticipates, in the argumentative text (e.g. a 
judicial opinion), the criticism that her respondent might have regard-
ing the appeal to the authority of economics and, in particular, the 
consistency of the economic opinion.161 
So far I have explained why, from a pragma-dialectical perspec-
tive, a legal decision-maker engaged in EAL argumentation must de-
fend herself against possible contentions that an economic opinion is 
inconsistent with what other economists say.  However, the con-
sistency criteria applied to an EAL argument could be broken down 
into different critical sub-questions. First comes a question on wheth-
er the adopted opinion is generally accepted in the academic commu-
nity, then, lacking that acceptance, comes a further question on 
whether there are reasons for the divergent opinion to be considered 
true.162  Once a scientific disagreement is revealed and becomes part 
of an argumentative discussion, the arguer should also be able to ex-
plain that, despite adopting an inconsistent economic opinion, the ap-
peal to the authority of economics is plausible. 
To say that the proponent of an EAL argument should justify 
why one expert opinion is to be preferred over another, does not 
mean that the arguer has to judge the merits of different models from 
which economic propositions are derived.  That is, if conflicting the-
ories divide the economic community, legal decision-makers are, of 
course, not expected to conduct empirical research to cure problems 
of economic indeterminacy and expand the boundaries of scientific 
 
 159.  Cf. Walton, supra note 150 at 773 (explain that one can utilized the “critical discus-
sion [model] to the argumentation in [a] given text of discourse to probe for weakness-
es in the structure of an argument and to ask the critical questions appropriate for a 
given type of argument.”). 
 160.  See Walton, supra note 150 at 773. 
 161.  Cf. F. H. VAN EEMEREN, R. GROOTENDORST & FRANCISCA SNOECK HENKEMANS, 
ARGUMENTATION: ANALYSIS, EVALUATION, PRESENTATION 50 (2002). (affirming that, 
due to implicit language use, the proponent should be aware of the weakness of the 
unexpressed premises of her argument so that possible doubts or criticism from the re-
spondent are anticipated in a critical discussion.). 
 162.  See WALTON, supra note 125 at 222. 
  
2017                            Labor Concerns in Brazilian Competition Policy 
178 
knowledge.  Rather, it is to be done by economists, within a typical 
theoretical discourse that is essentially distinct from the discourse 
produced by lawyers.163 
In a similar manner, legal decision-makers are not expected to 
solve the profound philosophical question of how a layperson can 
make an epistemologically sound choice between contradictory ex-
pert opinions.  In fact, it seems that even the literature on Law and 
Philosophy has been unable to come up with one universal solution 
for that conundrum.164  And this paper definitely does not purpose to 
contribute to that research agenda.  Still, and without going into 
much detail, two things can be said, as a partial conclusion for that 
philosophical problem.  First, a simple quantitative solution of “using 
the numbers,” as Goldman would say, is not necessarily appropriate 
from an epistemological point of view.165  Put differently, the fact that 
most experts in a relevant field of knowledge have the same views 
cannot always be taken as rational basis for believing on the majority 
opinion.166 
Second, despite the absence of a definitive criterion that deter-
mines which conflicting expert opinion a layperson should defer to, 
an unsolvable conflict of expertise that leads to arbitrary decisions 
does not seem to emerge most of the time.167  If it does, and the prob-
lem involves different opinions about the economic effects of a legal 
decision, my suggestion would be to retract the EAL argument, re-
placing it by another form of argumentation that does not rely on that 
 
 163.  See Tuori, supra note 10 at 186. 
 164.  For a recent review of that literature, see Gustavo A. Ribeiro, No need to toss a coin: 
conflicting scientific expert testimonies and intellectual due process, 12 LAW, 
PROBABILITY AND RISK 299–342, 4 (2013). 
 165.  Alvin I. Goldman, Experts: which ones should you trust?, 63 PHIL. & 
PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 85–110, 98 and 103 (2001). 
 166.  See Ribeiro, supra note 164 at 330. There are, of course, other criteria that could suf-
fice to avoid, in a concrete argumentative context, epistemic arbitrariness. See Gárbor 
Kutrovátz, Expert Authority and Ad Verecundiam Arguments,  in EXPLORING 
ARGUMENTATIVE CONTEXTS , 203 (Frans H. van Eemeren & Bart Garssen eds., 2012). 
 167.  This point contrasts with Brewer’s position that “a nonexpert judge or jury is, in a 
great many instances, not capable of performing in an epistemically nonarbitrary man-
ner.” Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process, 107 
YALE L.J. 1535, 1680 (1998). My view contrary to this skeptical position is grounded 
on the critiques by Ribeiro, supra note 164 at 341.; and Michael S. Pardo, The Field of 
Evidence and the Field of Knowledge, 24 L. & PHIL. 321–392, 372 (2005). 
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kind of expert knowledge.168  From a pragma-dialectical perspective, 
EAL should be put aside in that case, so as to prevent an inevitable 
argumentum ad verecundiam.  For all those reasons, I believe that, 
even though economists do disagree in many scientific issues, it does 
not weaken the logical analysis proposed here. 
IV. Inefficiency Thesis and Argument from Authority 
A. Inefficiency Thesis: Rational Reconstruction 
As we saw above in Section III.C, the main condition of plausi-
bility for EAL arguments is that the arguer complies with dialectical 
duties to acknowledge and justify an economic opinion that happens 
to be inconsistent within the academic community.  Let us now return 
to the Brazilian merger regime and continue my analysis of the Inef-
ficiency Thesis. To do so, we need to understand how that policy jus-
tification is logically structured, once it is taken as an instance of 
EAL argumentation. 
First of all, the Inefficiency Thesis has the structure of an argu-
mentative chain with consequentialist and authority elements, mutu-
ally related in a specific subordinate arrangement.  The consequen-
tialist argument would comprise a predictive proposition about the 
expected welfare losses produced by merger remedies applied to 
transactions between firms operating in relevant labor markets.  
Those propositions, in turn, would describe labor markets through 
models of perfect competition, reflecting the idea that mergers cannot 
create significant monopsony power and, therefore, that employment 
measures are necessarily inefficient remedies. 
To visualize the logical structure of the Inefficiency Thesis, I 
provide a rational reconstruction of that kind of EAL argumentation, 
so that we can identify each proposition advanced along the argu-
mentative chain. I adopt here the analytical technique and notation 
proposed by pragma-dialectics:169 
 
 168.  In fact, it seems that this retracting solution has been utilized by European judges in 
antitrust cases. Cf. Lianos, supra note 138 at 63. (“Absence of empirical evidence and 
consensus between economists may lead the judge to ignore economic expertise or 
base his choice of economic theory on extra-scientific grounds. . .”).  
 169.  About the schematic representation of arguments in pragma-dialectics, see EEMEREN, 
GROOTENDORST, AND SNOECK HENKEMANS, supra note 161 at 63. For a graphical 
scheme of the Inefficiency Thesis, see infra Appendix. 
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Level 1: consequentialist argument 
1. The interpretation of the antitrust statute that precludes the use 
of merger remedies in transactions between firms operating in labor 
markets is desired. 
1.1a The use of merger remedies in transactions between firms 
operating in labor markets reduces social welfare. 
(1.1b’) (The promotion of social welfare is a desired goal). 
Level 2: argument based on comparison 
1.1a The use of merger remedies in transactions between firms 
operating in labor markets reduces social welfare. 
1.1a.1a Competitive product markets are similar to labor mar-
kets. 
1.1a.1b The use of merger remedies in transactions between 
firms operating in competitive product markets reduces social wel-
fare. 
1.1a.1c Labor markets are generally competitive markets. 
Level 3: arguments from authority 
1.1a.1bThe use of merger remedies in transactions between 
firms operating in competitive product markets reduces social wel-
fare. 
1.1a.1b.1a Economics is a source of expert knowledge about 
product markets. 
1.1a.1b.1b Economics asserts that the use of merger remedies in 
a transaction between firms operating in competitive product markets 
reduces social welfare. 
1.1a.1b.1c The proposition that the use of merger remedies in 
transactions between firms operating in competitive product markets 
reduces social welfare is within the domain of economics. 
1.1a.1c Labor markets are generally competitive markets. 
1.1a.1c.1a Economics is a source of expert knowledge about la-
bor markets. 
1.1a.1c.1b Economics asserts that labor markets are generally 
competitive markets. 
1.1a.1c.1c The proposition that labor markets are generally 
competitive markets is within the domain of economics. 
As we can see, the Inefficiency Thesis is comprised of three lev-
els, each one conveying a different form of argumentation identified 
by specific argumentative schemes.  In the first level, there is a con-
sequentialist argument, which supports a normative conclusion stat-
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ing that CADE should interpret the antitrust statutes so as to exclude 
employment measures from the repertoire of merger remedies.  Un-
der that reading of the legislation, the Council would avoid ineffi-
cient outcomes, promoting social welfare via merger control.  In fact, 
Proposition 1, right at the beginning of the diagram, is the final con-
clusion of that entire EAL argumentation. 
The consequentialist argument is made up of two premises: 
Proposition 1.1b’ and Proposition 1.1a.  The former merely states the 
assumption that social welfare is a goal to be pursued by the competi-
tion policy.  As mentioned in Section II.A, the acceptability of that 
proposition is merely assumed here.  The second premise, however, 
is a theoretical proposition predicting that the consequence of em-
ployment measures is a decrease in social welfare.  The acceptability 
of Proposition 1.1a stems from the conclusion of another argument, 
which is included in the next level of the argumentative chain. 
The argument based on comparison, in the second level, is an 
argumentation form whose conclusion is supported by an analogy be-
tween the degree of competition in product markets and labor mar-
kets.  Among the premises of that analogical argument, there are two 
theoretical propositions about economic facts.  Proposition 1.1a.1b 
predicts that remedies imposed on a merged firm that operates in 
competitive product markets leads to welfare losses.  Proposition 
1.1a.1c describes labor markets as generally having a high degree of 
competition.  The acceptability of these two premises to the argument 
based on comparison, in turn, hinges on the plausibility of arguments 
from authority in the next level of the EAL argumentation. 
We can see that, in the third level, there are two different argu-
ments from authority.  The first one is an appeal to the authority of 
economics whose conclusion, Proposition 1.1a.1b, expresses an ex-
pert opinion about the economic effects of merger remedies.  But it is 
the other appeal to authority that is most relevant here.  The conclu-
sion of this second argument, Proposition 1.1a.1c, expresses an ex-
pert opinion stating that labor markets are, in general, competitive.  
This particular economic opinion is the backbone of the EAL argu-
mentation meant to justify the discontinuation of employment 
measures.  Indeed, my claim against the Inefficiency Thesis bears on 
the fact that the plausibility conditions of the second appeal to expert 
opinion might not be satisfied. 
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Of course, because the Inefficiency Thesis is a hypothetical, I 
cannot demonstrate that it is always an unsound argument.  The iden-
tification of informal fallacies requires the examination of the context 
of concrete argumentative discussions, particularly the language uti-
lized by discussants, and this paper indicates but one logical flaw 
from which the Inefficiency Thesis may suffer.170  Therefore, I can 
only claim that such EAL argumentation may become, in practice, an 
ad verecundiam fallacy.  It would happen if CADE, when proposing 
that argument, (i) does not acknowledge that Proposition 1.1a.1c is 
inconsistent with the views of some labor economists; and (ii) does 
not justify why that proposition should be nonetheless accepted. 
In the next section, I conclude my analysis by calling into ques-
tion the acceptability of Proposition 1.1a.1c.  To do so, I show below 
that the economic opinion that “labor markets are generally competi-
tive markets” is not indisputable within the academic community.  
Then my claim against the Inefficiency Thesis will be defended. 
Section IV. 
B. Imperfect Competition in Labor Markets 
We already know that the fundamental premise of the Inefficien-
cy Thesis is that “labor markets are generally competitive markets.” 
But this proposition can only be accepted as true in a critical discus-
sion if the appeal to the authority of economics is indeed a plausible 
argument.  This mostly depends, in turn, on the consistency of the 
expert opinion with the views of other experts in economics.  The 
soundness of the Inefficiency Thesis hinges on whether economists 
agree that labor markets are generally competitive.  That said, I 
demonstrate now why such EAL argumentation is likely to become 
an ad verecundiam fallacy. 
Despite an apparent consensus, the truth is that even neoclassical 
economists take issue with models of perfect competition as explana-
 
 170.  See Frans H. van Eemeren, Fallacies as Derailments of Argumentative Discourse: 
Acceptance Based on Understanding and Critical Assessment, 59 JOURNAL OF 
PRAGMATICS 141–152, 150 (2013).Cf. EEMEREN AND GROOTENDORST, supra note 103 
at 184 (“One of the consequences of the frequent occurrence of implicit language use 
in argumentative discourse and texts is that the identification of a possible fallacy usu-
ally has a conditional character.”). 
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tion of labor market outcomes.171  The fact that the description of la-
bor markets as perfectly competitive is not undisputable in the litera-
ture reveals a sort of economic indeterminacy about the existence of 
monopsony power.  This epistemological limitation of the economic 
science is particularly relevant when it comes to determine the empir-
ical validity of models of monopsony in labor markets.172 
As we know from standard economic theory, a monopsonistic 
firm is not simply a price-taker, which only decides the volume of 
input purchased at the clearing market price.  On the contrary, its 
buying decisions affect the very functioning of input markets and in-
duce lower prices for these goods or services.173  It occurs because, in 
the monopsony model, a firm faces an upward-sloping supply curve, 
i.e., a supply of input that is not perfectly elastic.174  Accordingly, as 
an employer deciding on the quantity of labor to be purchased, a mo-
nopsonist firm ends up hiring fewer employees, and at lower wages, 
than it would in a competitive market.175 
Of course, when one considers that actual labor markets might 
operate under imperfect competition, I do not have in mind the clas-
 
 171.  Cf. ALAN MANNING, MONOPSONY IN MOTION: IMPERFECT COMPETITION IN LABOR 
MARKETS 10 (2003). (“[G]eneral impression given by most textbooks is that employ-
ers have negligible market power over their workers or that this is, at best, a trivial 
side issue.”). Indeed, the apparent consensus regarding the competition functioning of 
labor markets is reflect on Law and Economics literature as well. See, e.g., Michael L. 
Wachter, Labor Economics: Its Implications for Labor and Employment Law,  in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW , 24 (Mi-
chael L. Wachter & Cynthia L. Estlund eds., 2013). (“[T]here is little evidence of ma-
terial monopsony power in U.S.”); Christine Jolls, Employment Law, 2  in HANDBOOK 
OF LAW AND ECONOMICS , 1356 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007). 
(“[M]onopsony-based market failure [. . .], while of theoretical interest, is generally 
believed to have limited practical importance.”); Daniel J. Chepaitis, The National La-
bor Relations Act, Non-Paralleled Competition, and Market Power, 85 CALIFORNIA 
LAW REVIEW 769, 780–81 (1997). (“[M]ost economists and legal theorist accept that 
[. . .] the exercise of market power by employing firms is not a serious issue in con-
temporary America.”); and RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE 
AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 87 (1995). (“Employment markets are 
normally competitive, but they need not remain so if government is allowed to set 
terms with which all firms must comply.”). 
 172.  For a literature review of the static models of labor market monopsony, see William 
M. Boal & Michael R. Ransom, Monopsony in the Labor Market,  JOURNAL OF 
ECONOMIC LITERATURE 86–112 (1997). 
 173.  See BLAIR AND HARRISON, supra note 79 at 44. 
 174.  Cf. Orley C. Ashenfelter, Henry Farber & Michael R. Ransom, Labor Market Monop-
sony, 28 JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS 203–210, 205 (2010). 
 175.  See BLAIR AND HARRISON, supra note 79 at 44. 
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sical monopsony, modelled as a single firm employing the entire la-
bor force.  Rather, a more realistic account of labor markets would be 
given by models of oligopsony or monopsonistic competition, in 
which a few employers have some degree of market power over 
workers.176  According to Bhaskar et al., these models would offer a 
better explanation for several empirical findings that cannot be 
properly understood within the paradigm of perfect competition.  
Among these economic phenomena, the referred authors include, 
e.g., wage dispersion across firms, market provision of general train-
ing to workers and even minimum wages laws with non-negative ef-
fects on employment.177 
In any case, a conclusion about widespread monopsony power in 
labor markets, while somehow appealing, does not seem to be justi-
fied in view of the structure of most of these markets.178  Early eco-
nomic studies have already shown that labor markets are not in fact 
excessively concentrated.179  There is, however, another theoretical 
perspective on that matter. For instance, one may consider that, re-
gardless of market structure, labor markets can still be imperfectly 
competitive due to important market frictions, such as those which 
create mobility costs for workers when searching for new jobs (i.e. 
job search models).  Following that same approach, monopsony 
power could also result from the heterogeneity of job positions avail-
able in the labor markets, regarding the required skills and the locali-
zation of employing firms (i.e. job differentiation models).180 
Developing on those models, Manning introduces a theory of 
dynamic monopsony, in contrast to the classic static model in labor 
economics literature.  His approach to modelling labor market mo-
nopsony is based on two key elements: recruiting activity and labor 
turnover. According to Manning, what limits the exercise of market 
power over employees is the effective possibility that they leave their 
 
 176.  See Venkataraman Bhaskar, Alan Manning & Ted To, Oligopsony and Monopsonistic 
Competition in Labor Markets, 16 THE JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 155–
174, 156 (2002). 
 177.  See Id. at 165. 
 178.  See Id. at 170. 
 179.  Cf. Boal and Ransom, supra note 172 at 104. (acknowledging that “[t]he body of evi-
dence from studies comparing concentration with wages fails to be convincing.”). 
 180.  See Alan Manning, The Real Thin Theory: Monopsony in Modern Labour Markets, 
10 LABOUR ECONOMICS 105–131, 107 (2003). 
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current employer for jobs at another firm.181  The competition in labor 
markets depends then on the potential mobility of employees across 
different employers.182  From that perspective, and considering labor 
turnover, the proportion of recruited workers in a given firm who 
were previously employed becomes a rough, but useful, measure of 
the rivalry between employers in the market.183 
Moreover, the monopsonist faces an upward-sloping supply 
curve also in the dynamic model, as labor cost continue to increase 
with the firm’s employment level.  In this case, increasing labor costs 
reflects, for the most part, diseconomies of scale in recruiting and 
training new workers.184  The imperfect elasticity of labor supply de-
notes that workers cannot find alternative job positions, so as to avoid 
monopsonistic exploitation in form of wage cuts by employers with 
market power.  According to Manning, the lack of job positions is not 
necessarily associated with market structure, i.e., with a small num-
ber of firms purchasing labor, as it would be expected in static mo-
nopsony models.185  Instead, from a dynamic viewpoint, an employ-
er’s monopsony power emerges due to the existence of few vacancies 
at competing firms in the same labor market.186 
What happens is that, because job positions are costly even be-
fore workers are recruited,187 and firms believe to be unable to fill 
these positions offering wages below the competitive level, employ-
ers decide beforehand not to create new jobs.188  The few actual va-
cancies in labor markets can only be understood as unavoidable “ac-
cidents,” occurring when firms decide on the quantity of labor to 
purchase to maximize their profits at the chosen wage rate.189  In the 
 
 181.  See MANNING, supra note 171 at 44. 
 182.  See Id. at 44. 
 183.  See Id. at 49. 
 184.  See Id. at 35. Indeed, the idea that monopsony power in labor markets is associated 
with diseconomies of scale in recruiting activities comes from job-searching models, 
such as the one proposed by Burnett and Mortensen. See Boal and Ransom, supra note 
172 at 108. See also Kenneth Burdett & Dale T. Mortensen, Wage Differentials, Em-
ployer Size, and Unemployment, 39 INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW 257 (1998). 
 185.  See Manning, supra note 180 at 106. 
 186.  See Id. at 108. 
 187.  Cf. MANNING, supra note 171 at 273. (“Typically, capital must be committed in ad-
vance of a worker being recruited: this might be in the form of an investment in ma-
chines or an investment in creating a market for the output.”). 
 188.  See Id. at 270. 
 189.  See Id. at 279–280. 
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end, Manning concludes that regardless of the market structure “the 
fact that the majority of employers have no vacancy at a particular 
moment in time makes worker search for alternative jobs more 
difficult, contributing to the lack of competition in labor markets.” 190 
Although dynamic models do not link imperfect competition to 
market structure, the geographical distribution of vacancies still 
seems relevant to explain the extension of monopsony power.  Imper-
fect competition in labor markets has to do with market “thinness,” as 
a pre-condition for firms to exert market power over their employ-
ees.191  Even if there are several potential employers, a labor market 
could still be considered “thin” from workers’ point of view, because 
only limited job opportunities exist within the reach of prospective 
employees.192  Indeed, the effects of thinness, as modelled in the dy-
namic monopsony, would be comparable to the “thinness” in the stat-
ic monopsony sense, i.e., the existence of only a few employers in a 
concentrated labor market.193 
Despite its contribution, the theory of dynamic monopsony of-
fers more of an explanatory model than a framework for normative 
analyses of markets.  As Manning himself acknowledges, one cannot 
derive from dynamic models precise policy recommendations to deal 
with welfare losses that may arise from firms’ monopsony power.194  
Those models do suggest, however, that perfect competition in labor 
markets should not be fanatically assumed as the only possible de-
scription of real labor markets.195  Accordingly, building on dynamic 
models, Manning was able to demonstrate at least that, once we take 
into account relevant market frictions, labor market regulation can 
really be welfare-enhancing.196 
Thus, if one accepts that firms have a non-negligible degree of 
monopsony power, the seemingly inevitable trade-off between effi-
 
 190.  Id. at 280. 
 191.  See Manning, supra note 180 at 124. 
 192.  See Id. at 107. 
 193.  See Id. at 125. 
 194.  See MANNING, supra note 171 at 58.   
 195.  Cf. Id. at 50. (“It is important to correct the impression that those who believe that 
employers have some market power over workers are extremists—the reality is that 
those who believe in perfect competition are the fanatics. . .”). 
 196.  See Alan Manning, Monopsony and the Efficiency of Labour Market Interventions, 11 
LABOUR ECONOMICS 145–163, 147 (2004). 
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ciency and equality in labor market regulation disappears.197  The 
case for an efficient regulation rests then on the empirical question as 
to the optimal level of policy intervention in labor markets.198  And, 
besides the typical regulatory measures − viz. minimum wages and 
unionization −, even antitrust laws can be useful to induce a high 
elasticity of labor supplied to monopsonist firms.199  Manning’s point 
about labor market regulation is that dynamic models offer “theoreti-
cal arguments [that] can give some support to those whose approach 
to policy is more pragmatic than ideological.”200 
In addition to his theoretical work, Manning also attempted to 
verify the actual market power of employing firms.  The author 
builds on the dynamic monopsony theory to estimate the elasticity of 
labor supply through an analysis of firms’ recruiting and separation 
rates.201 According to him, the labor supply curve to employers in the 
US and the UK does not seem to be perfectly elastic.  Despite some-
what imprecise results, the Manning concludes that his “estimates 
imply that employers have sizeable amounts of monopsony power,” 
so that paid wages could be 17% below in comparison to competition 
levels.202  Of course, that was not the only study testing for the dy-
namic models.  Now I move on to a brief review of other recent em-
pirical papers on labor market monopsony. 
Ransom and Sims examine evidence of monopsony power in la-
bor markets for school teachers in the State of Missouri, USA.203  
They adopt Manning’s approach to labor monopsony and try to infer 
the elasticity of labor supply to each school district, given the wage 
levels in the 1980s.  According to the authors, even though there are 
several districts in Missouri, the elasticity of labor supply is rather 
low, mostly due to teachers’ preferences regarding the location of 
their employer, which, consequently, reduces the mobility of those 
 
 197.  See Alan Manning, A Generalised Model of Monopsony, 116 THE ECONOMIC 
JOURNAL 84–100, 84 (2006). 
 198.  See Manning, supra note 196 at 159. 
 199.  Cf. Ashenfelter, Farber, and Ransom, supra note 174 at 209. 
 200.  Manning, supra note 196 at 159. 
 201.  See MANNING, supra note 171 at 80. 
 202.  Id. at 80. 
 203.  Michael R. Ransom & David P. Sims, Estimating the Firm’s Labor Supply Curve in a 
“New monopsony” Framework: School teachers in Missouri, 28 JOURNAL OF LABOR 
ECONOMICS 331–355 (2010). 
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workers across different schools.204  The study concludes that “labor 
market frictions give employers enough power to reduce wages 
somewhere in the neighborhood of 27% when compared with a world 
of perfectly informed and mobile workers.”205 
In another paper, Staiger at al. analyze whether there is monop-
sony power in the labor market for registered nurses.206  They make 
use of a legislated change in wages at hospitals of the U.S. Depart-
ment of Veteran Affairs to calculate the elasticity of supply in nurse 
labor markets.  According to them, “[o]ur analysis provides [ . . .] ev-
idence that suggest that hospitals have market power in the nurse la-
bor market and have monopsony power in setting wages.”207 The 
market power of hospitals could be explained then, following the dy-
namic monopsony model, as consequence of nurses’ preference for 
particular employers, which induces a segmentation of labor supply 
in these markets.208 
Ransom and Oaxaca, studying a grocery retail chain at the 
southwestern U.S., analyze the labor supply elasticity for workers of 
both gender.209  They find that “[t]he difference in the labor supply 
elasticities of men and women suggests a role for monopsony power 
in explaining male/female differences in pay.”210 According to the au-
thors, the comparatively lower wage elasticity of labor supplied by 
female workers, and the potential market power of their employer, 
could help explain the sex difference in pay.211  Indeed, even a lim-
ited exercise of monopsony power, due to institutional constraints 
(e.g. minimum wages and union activity), would contribute to such 
gender wage gap.212 
 
 204.  See Id. at 350. 
 205.  Id. at 352–3. 
 206.  Douglas O. Staiger, Joanne Spetz & Ciaran S. Phibbs, Is There Monopsony in the La-
bor Market? Evidence from a Natural Experiment, 28 JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS 
211–236 (2010). 
 207.  Id. at 231. 
 208.  See Id. at 232. 
 209.  Michael R. Ransom & Ronald L. Oaxaca, New Market Power Models and Sex Differ-
ences in Pay, 28 J. LAB. ECON. 267 (2010). 
 210.  Michael R. Ransom & Ronald L. Oaxaca, New Market Power Models and Sex Differ-
ences in Pay, 28 JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS 267–289, 287 (2010). 
 211.  See Id. at 287. 
 212.  See Id. at 285. 
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Hirsch et al.213 also estimate the wage elasticity of men and 
women’s labor supply at the firm level, as an attempt to determine 
whether differences in pay could be explained by the shape of supply 
curves for male and female workers.  According to them, “[o]ne im-
portant general insight is that estimated labor supply elasticities are 
far from the conventional textbook case of being perfectly elastic,”214 
which would demonstrate that the empirical data do not reject the 
dynamic monopsony model.  The study concludes that at least one-
third of the sex difference in pay could be explained as due to the less 
wage-elastic supply of labor by women.215 
On other hand, Hirsch et al. critically remark that the gender pay 
gap does not necessary result from the low wage-elasticity of labor 
supplied.216  They assert that, besides the estimation of labor supply 
curves, the concrete exercise of market power by employing firms is 
another empirical issue to be tackled.217  The same remark is made in 
Hirsch and Schumacher study about the impact of market concentra-
tion in the health sector.218In this paper, the authors test for both the 
static and dynamic models to analyze the monopsony power of hospi-
tals over registered nurses.  At first, testing for the dynamic monop-
sony, Hirsch and Schumacher do not find evidence of wage cuts, 
even though the labor supply curve is not perfectly elastic.219  Then 
they test for the static monopsony, but only find evidence of low 
wages in the short-run, an effect which probably would disappear as 
labor markets evolve.220 
Hirsch and Schumacher’s point that “upward sloping labor sup-
ply is a necessary but not sufficient condition for monopolistic out-
 
 213.  Boris Hirsch, Thorsten Schank & Claus Schnabel, Differences in Labor Supply to 
Monopsonistic Firms and the Gender Pay Gap: An Empirical Analysis Using Linked 
Employer-employee Data from Germany, 28 JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS 291–330 
(2010). 
 214.  Id. at 314. 
 215.  See Id. at 314. 
 216.  Boris Hirsch, Thorsten Schank & Claus Schnabel, Differences in Labor Supply to 
Monopsonistic Firms and the Gender Pay Gap: An Empirical Analysis Using Linked 
Employer-employee Data from Germany, 28 J. LAB. ECON. 291 (2010). 
 217.  See Hirsch, Schank, and Schnabel, supra note 213 at 315. 
 218.  Barry T. Hirsch & Edward J. Schumacher, Classic or New Monopsony? Searching for 
Evidence in Nursing Labor Markets, 24 JOURNAL OF HEALTH ECONOMICS 969–989 
(2005). 
 219.  See Id. at 987. 
 220.  See Id. at 987. 
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comes” contrasts with Manning’s conclusion about the prevailing 
monopsony power in labor markets.221  To some extent, issues about 
the existence of concrete, and observable, effects of market power are 
also present in Kuhn’s criticism against the dynamic monopsony 
model.222  According to him, Manning’s work ignores what, in the 
industrial organization, is the method commonly adopted to deter-
mine market power, viz., the definition of relevant geographic mar-
kets and concentration ratios.223 
In any case, at least one recent empirical study has included a 
spatial dimension in the analysis of monopsony power, which, as in 
the dynamic monopsony, is modelled as a result of market frictions 
reducing workers’ inter-firm mobility. In their study, Muehlemann et 
al.224 adopted a measure of time-travel distances to construct and ana-
lyze local labor markets in Switzerland.225  These relevant markets 
are defined as the area surrounding town centers, so that the authors 
can capture aspects of the fewness of employers within that geo-
graphical space.226  They conclude that their paper “contrasts to some 
earlier studies that found no effect for employer concentration on pay 
when controls are imposed for other locality-specific factors.” 227 
Obviously, the short, and rather superficial, review above is not 
meant to cover the entire literature on labor market monopsony, let 
alone assess the theoretical coherence or the empirical validity of dy-
namic and static monopsony models.  I leave that work to an econo-
mist.228  In fact, this section purposes only to show that there is an 
ongoing debate over the right characterization of competition in labor 
markets.  That is why, in a critical discussion, Proposition 1.1a.1c, 
introduced in Section IV.A, should not be taken as true at face value.  
In other words, since there is no understanding among economists on 
 
 221.  Id. at 970. 
 222.  See Peter Kuhn, Is Monopsony the Right Way to Model Labor Markets? A Review of 
Alan Manning’s Monopsony in Motion, 11 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF THE 
ECONOMICS OF BUSINESS 369–378 (2004). 
 223.  See Id. at 376. 
 224.   Id. 
 225.  Samuel Muehlemann, Paul Ryan & Stefan C. Wolter, Monopsony Power, Pay Struc-
ture, and Training, 66 INDUSTRIAL & LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW 1097–1114 (2013). 
 226.  See Id. at 1101. 
 227.  Id. at 111. 
 228.  For a comprehensive literature review on the topic, see Alan Manning, Imperfect 
Competition in the Labor Market, 4B in HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS 973–1041 
(Orley C. Ashenfelter & David Card eds., 2011). 
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whether labor markets are generally competitive, that proposition 
cannot be seen as derived from an authoritative opinion to which a 
discussant could rationally appeal. 
This finding allows us to conclude that the plausibility of the In-
efficiency Thesis, from a pragma-dialectic perspective, requires such 
disagreement among expert economists to be recognized and ad-
dressed by CADE.  If an EAL argumentation is proposed in support 
to the implementation choice of discontinuing employment measures, 
the Council would produce a fallacy if the economic opinion adopted 
is deliberately presented as a consensual.  To avoid an argumentum 
ad verecundiam, CADE should thus make explicit that Proposition 
1.1a.1c, even if majoritarian, is not consistent with the views of some 
economists.  Additionally, to maintain the plausibility the Inefficien-
cy Thesis in a critical discussion, CADE has to be able to explain 
why that proposition should nonetheless be accepted as an accurate 
description of labor market functioning, at least within legal dis-
course. 
Obviously, attempts to justify an inconsistent expert opinion 
would lead to sub-discussions in which EAL argumentation can also 
be employed.  Let me briefly explain, before finishing this paper, 
which kind of argument could be utilized to justify the acceptability 
of an inconsistent expert opinion.  We know that the competition law 
literature has already faced the problem of conflicting models for the 
economic analysis of anticompetitive practices.229  For instance, 
Wright proposes that the choice between models should be grounded 
on the decision theory, taken as an economic tool meant reduce the 
risk of wrong decisions that may ban efficient market behavior.230  To 
do so, one should consider the probabilities of false positives and 
false negatives in decision-making – or, at least, reasonable assump-
 
 229.  Cf., e.g., Joshua D. Wright, Abandoning Antitrust’s Chicago Obsession: The Case for 
Evidence-Based Antitrust, 78 ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL 241–271, 253 (2012). 
 230.  Cf. C. Frederick Beckner III & Steven C. Salop, Decision Theory and Antitrust Rules,  
ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL 41–76, 41 (1999). (“Decision theory sets out a process for 
making factual determinations and decisions when information is costly and therefore 
imperfect.”).See Wright, supra note 246 at 248 and 263. The decision theory, and con-
cerns with false positives and false negative in antitrust decision-making, has integrat-
ed the competition law literature mainly since Easterbrook’s error-cost analysis. See 
Frank H. Easterbrook, Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1–40 (1984). 
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tions about them –, in order to analyze the cost of errors in antitrust 
implementation.231 
Indeed, the use error-cost analysis in statutory interpretation 
could be thought of as an instance of EAL argumentation.  That ar-
gument would also depend, however, on economic knowledge of 
how markets actually work.  It means that, in trying to justify a non-
consensual opinion about labor markets, CADE would once again 
appeal to an expert opinion, which might be considered equally in-
consistent within the academic community.  The argumentum ad ver-
ecundiam could become, in this case, almost inevitable.  Moreover, 
as critics point out, the error-cost analysis seems to hinge on empiri-
cal assumptions that lead decision-makers to consistently oppose an-
titrust intervention.232  If it is so, the use of error-cost analysis could 
turn out to be a fallacy because of that bias alone, as it may impede a 
critical discussion.233 
In any case, the plausibility of legal argumentation based on er-
ror-cost analyses is an issue that cannot be further developed here.  
As we saw above in Section IV.C, this paper is not really concerned 
with finding solutions to the problem of how to choose between con-
flicting expert opinions, or, particularly, between different models for 
antitrust analysis.  On the contrary, all I wanted to show here is that 
disagreements between experts, including economists, create logical 
flaws in arguments that rely on knowledge produced outside legal 
discourse. 
 
 231.  See F. S. McChesney, Easterbrook on Errors, 6 JOURNAL OF COMPETITION LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 11–31, 29–30 (2010).  
 232.  In fact, these empirical assumptions in error-cost analysis lead to a conclusion that 
false negative should be preferred over false positives. Cf. Alan Devlin & Michael Ja-
cobs, Antitrust Error, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 75–132, 97 (2010). (“[T]he  preference  
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costly, and (b) irreversible. These premises may be mistaken, however, because nei-
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Out of “Error Cost” Analysis: What’s Wrong with Antitrust’s Right, 80 ANTITRUST 
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 233.  See Douglas N. Walton, Bias, Critical Doubt and Fallacies, 28 ARGUMENTATION AND 
ADVOCACY 1–22, 21 (1991). 
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V. Conclusion 
The long line of thought developed in the previous sections leads 
us, in the end, to a straightforward conclusion: the Inefficiency The-
sis may become an argumentum ad verecundiam.  My claim is that 
such argument could be, in practice, an informal fallacy, correspond-
ing to an unsound appeal to the authority of economics.  It would on-
ly occur, however, if CADE conceals that the economic opinion as-
serting the perfect competition in most labor markets is not 
consensual among economists.  Moreover, even if the lack of consen-
sus is reveled, the Council would have to explain why, despite incon-
sistent within the economic community, that opinion should be ac-
cepted in a critical discussion about legal theses. 
The logical analysis carried out in this paper allowed me to chal-
lenge policy justifications that, resorting only to economic theory, 
purpose to legitimize CADE’s implementation choice to discontinue 
employment measures in competition law.  More generally, my point 
was that epistemological limitations in economic science − under-
stood as the disagreement among economist − create indeterminacy 
about how actual labor markets work.  This, according to pragma-
dialectical theory, affects the plausibility of EAL argumentation 
meant to justify the broken interplay between merger control and la-
bor market regulation in Brazil. 
Of course, my claim is about one hypothetical argument which 
CADE could possibly make use of.  Anyhow, although not categori-
cal in respect to the Inefficiency Thesis, my conclusions are still, and 
perhaps mostly, relevant at a more theoretical level.  The analysis of 
EAL argumentation, from a pragma-dialectical perspective, made it 
possible to identity and delve into the conditions for a plausible use 
of economic knowledge in legal reasoning. 
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